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IN THE MODERN American economy, fluctuations in unemployment usu- 
ally persist from one year to the next. Past decades have seen two lengthy 
deviations from equilibrium in the labor market: 1958 through 1963, when 
the market was slack for six straight years, and 1964 through 1970, when it 
was tight for seven straight years. Virtually all forecasters agree today that 
the sharp recession of 1974-75 will mark the beginning of another extended 
period of slack, with the official unemployment rate above 6 percent per- 
haps until the end of the decade. These forecasts are fully consistent with 
the behavior of the economy after the only comparable postwar recession, 
in 1957-58. Explanation of the persistence of unemployment has been a 
major focus of macroeconomic theory since the Great Depression. Though 
his predecessors had begun to think seriously about the challenge to classi- 
cal economic  theory raised by successive years of  high unemployment, 
John Maynard Keynes was the great pioneer in creating a theory that came 
to  grips with the facts of persistent unemployment, and he remains the 
dominant figure today. 
This paper presents a detailed critique of modern explanations of the be- 
havior of unemployment, both within the Keynesian tradition and outside 
it. The critique begins with a close look at the modern theory of disequi- 
librium, which claims to provide a microeconomic foundation for the the- 
ory of unemployment and wage adjustment. This theory attributes both the 
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rigidity  of wages  and  the  persistence  of unemployment  to the slow  diffusion 
of information  within  the labor  market.  The evidence  presented  here,  how- 
ever,  suggests  that unemployment  in the modern  American  economy  per- 
sists  far  longer  than  is remotely  plausible  if this factor  is the main  cause  of 
the  lag  in market  clearing.  This  hypothesis  is strongly  confirmed  by a study 
of the  data  under  the assumption  that  three  months  is long  enough  for  both 
workers  and employers  to find  out what  is happening  in the labor  market. 
The paper  then turns  to a group  of theories  that are more  traditionally 
Keynesian  in flavor.  First  is the belief  that  labor  unions  are  responsible  for 
the rigidity  of wages. Keynes'  theory of effective  demand  showed con- 
vincingly  that  rigid  wages  can  permit  persistent  unemployment,  and  Keynes 
himself,  as well as his successors,  appeared  to hold labor  unions  primarily 
responsible  for the nonclassical  behavior  of wages.  Closely  related  is the 
theory  of wage  determination  based  on "idiosyncratic  exchange."  This  the- 
ory emphasizes  the bilateral  monopoly  between  individual  workers  and 
employers,  which  biases  against  the adjustment  of wages  in the short  run 
and  makes  equity  an important  element  in wage  determination.  These  two 
theories  share  an essential  defect:  however  successful  they  are  in explaining 
wage  rigidity  in a particular  sector,  they  do not seem  capable  of explaining 
economy-wide  rigidity.  As long as a competitive  residual  sector with a 
flexible  wage  exists,  workers  who are  unable  to find  jobs in the rigid-wage 
sector  will find  it in the residual  sector  and its wage  will be depressed  as a 
result. Overall,  the labor market  will clear even if one sector has rigid 
wages.  If unions  and other  sources  of rigidity  in particular  sectors  have a 
role in persistent  unemployment,  it is more subtle than the traditional 
Keynesian  view supposes. 
Empirical  evidence  on the behavior  of wages,  presented  next, suggests 
that the modern  American  economy contains  an important  sector with 
rigid wages.  Though  unionism  and idiosyncratic  exchange  are present  in 
this sector,  its defining  characteristic  is different.  The sector  with  inflexible 
wages  consists  of government,  regulated  industries,  and nonprofit  institu- 
tions.  These  industries  make  up what  I will call the "nonentrepreneurial" 
sector,  in which  employers  do not face  the  usual  incentive  to minimize  labor 
cost. The empirical  results  suggest  that the nonentrepreneurial  sector is 
much  the most important  source  of wage  rigidity  in today's  economy. 
After isolating  the major  source  of wage rigidity  in the contemporary 
U.S. economy,  the paper  goes on to present  a theory  of the transmission, 
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the supply  side  of unemployment  is shown  to imply  that  competitive  wages 
will  not fall far  enough  to clear  the labor  market  at low frictional  levels of 
unemployment  when  aggregate  demand  falls. Rather,  the duration  of un- 
employment  will rise  as the unemployed  search  longer  for the high-paying 
jobs  in the  rigid-wage  sector.  During  a contraction,  the  payoff  to job search 
rises because  the wage premium  for these good jobs rises. Conversely, 
search  is less useful  to the unemployed  when  the labor  market  is unusually 
tight,  as competitive  wages  rise close to rigid  wages.  The existence  of the 
rigid-wage  sector  lessens  the ability  of the competitive  sector  to push the 
wage down to its market-clearing  level during  a contraction.  The paper 
does  not contain  direct  evidence  of this  mechanism,  but does  show  that  the 
observed  relation  between  unemployment  and relative  wages in the two 
sectors  accords  roughly  with the predictions  of the theory. 
All of the theories  discussed  here are Keynesian  in the sense that they 
explain  why the mechanism  of effective  demand  can operate  without  the 
immediate  corrective  force of market-clearing  wage adjustments.  They 
agree that the basic cause of an increase  in unemployment  is contrac- 
tionary  aggregate  policy  or other  shocks  in the economy,  and  similarly  that 
expansionary  policy  can eliminate  excessive  unemployment.  With  the pos- 
sible exception  of some versions  of the theory  of disequilibrium,  none of 
these  theories  can fairly  be accused  of making  persistent  unemployment  a 
voluntary  phenomenon  arising  from the supply  side of the labor  market. 
Rather,  all of the theories  that  appear  to have  any explanatory  power  con- 
cur that unemployment  is the result  of inadequate  demand  for labor.  The 
interaction  of demand  and supply  is described  in greater  detail  in the next 
section. 
Theories  of Unemployment 
A simple two-equation  structural  model of the economy  captures  the 
theoretical  relationships  that are  important  for the issues  addressed  by this 
paper  and can encompass  the alternative  theories  considered  here. 
(1)  effective demand: ut =  f(wt,  xt); 
(2)  wage  adjustment:  wt -  wt-  =  g(ut)  +  t -  wt-. 
Here  ut  is the unemployment  rate  and  the functionfembodies  the effective- 
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and Okun's  law for translating  it into the unemployment  rate. Effective 
aggregate  demand  depends  negatively  on the  nominal  wage,  wt, through  the 
Keynes and Pigou effects, and depends  on various policy variables,  xt 
(monetarists  and  Keynesians  disagree  about  the presence  of fiscal  variables 
in xt, but that does not matter  here). In the wage-adjustment  equation, 
g(ut) is the disequilibrium component and w-t  -  Wti  is the expected or 
equilibrium  component.'  Monetarists  usually  write  the equation  in a pre- 
cisely  equivalent  form, 
(3)  Ut =  g(wt-  , 
and call it "aggregate  supply."2 
A convenient  algebraic  specification  of the system  is 
(4)  effective  demand:  ut =  -  i/i(mt  -  wt)  +  nt; 
(5)  wage  adjustment:  wt -  wti  =  -k1(ut  -  u*)  +  Wt  -  Wt-i  +  Et, 
where  u* is the equilibrium  value.  H-ere  I have switched  to taking  w as the 
log of the nominal  wage,  m as the log of the  money  supply,  and  u as the log 
of the unemployment  rate.  I assume,  for simplicity,  that other  policy  vari- 
ables,  represented  by x in the previous  form  of the equation,  do not enter 
in determining  effective  demand.  The  equations  also  contain  random  shifts, 
77  and  e. In a structural  model,  the fundamental  explanation  of the behavior 
of the endogenous  variables  resides  in the reduced  form, which  gives the 
impact  of the predetermined  variables  on the endogenous  variables  after 
taking  account  of the interdependence  of the endogenous  variables  in the 
equations.  Statements  dealing  with causal  relations  between  endogenous 
variables-such as  "high wages cause excessive unemployment"-are 
meaningless  or contradictory  in a structural  model. High wages  are asso- 
ciated with high unemployment  in the aggregate-demand  equation,  but 
with low unemployment  in the wage-adjustment  equation.  The reduced- 
form  equation  for unemployment  sorts  out the interaction  of the two vari- 
ables  in both equations: 
(6)  Ut = u*  +  -o  -1/(mt 
-  t 
-  Et)  +  77t 
1. More generally, wi -  Wt  embodies the inertia that is widely believed to  be 
present  in wage determination.  The evidence  suggests  that expectations  are only a part 
of the explanation  of inertia,  but the use of the term  is so widespread  that I will adopt it 
here. 
2. Thomas J. Sargent  studied exactly this two-equation  system in monetarist  form 
in "Rational Expectations,  the Real Rate of Interest,  and the Natural Rate of Unem- 
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The  major  issues  of the theory  of unemployment  that  are  considered  in this 
paper  concern  the values  of the parameters  in this equation,  the specifica- 
tion of the expected  wage,  and the behavior  of the random  shifts.  First is 
the role of the nominal  wage  in determining  real aggregate  demand,  con- 
trolled  by the  parameter  01.  In the  crude  Keynesian  model  with  the  liquidity 
trap  and  no Pigou  effect,  aip  =  0, wage  adjustment  is irrelevant,  and  unem- 
ployment  remains  at a level determined  by the effective-demand  process: 
(7)  crude  Keynesian  reduced  form: ut =  u* +  {o +  ft. 
Empirical  evidence  reviewed  later in the paper reveals clearly  that the 
nominal  wage  exerts  a strong  force  on real  aggregate  demand  through  the 
Keynes  and  Pigou  effects,  so the  crude  Keynesian  model  deserves  no further 
consideration. 
The second major  issue is the responsiveness  of the nominal  wage to 
excess  supply  or demand  in the labor  market,  measured  by the parameter 
q5. In a classical  model with virtually  instantaneous  clearing  of the labor 
market,  q$ is extremely  large and unemployment  never deviates  from its 
equilibrium  value, u*: 
(8)  classical reduced form: ut =  u*. 
The classical  model is unable  to explain  any of the fluctuations  in unem- 
ployment  and also deserves  no further  consideration.  All modern  theories 
rest crucially  on the hypothesis  of temporary  inflexibility  of wages  to ex- 
plain the behavior of unemployment: the Phillips curve is an essential  part 
of all contemporary  macroeconomic  models. One of the major tasks of this 
paper  is to appraise  the current  state of theories  of the Phillips  curve. 
The third major  issue is the specification  of the expectation  term, wt. 
Modern  Keynesians  generally  concede  the importance  of this variable  in 
determining  unemployment,  but  view  it as responding  sluggishly  to the  past 
history  of inflation.  Modern  Keynesian  theory,  which  combines  this view 
with the beliefs that money matters  (i1f is large) and that wages adjust 
slowly  (01  is small),  permeates  the thinking  of most economists  and  policy- 
makers,  including  many who would not call themselves  Keynesians.  The 
consensus  on the Keynesian  diagnosis  of the present  state  of the U.S. econ- 
omy  is particularly  strong:  expectations  of high  rates  of inflation  and other 
sources  of inflationary  momentum  are deeply  embedded  in the economy 
today  as a result  of more  than  a decade  of accelerating  inflation.  Monetary 
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monetary growth. As a result, the term mt -  ivt, which appears in the re- 
duced form with a strong  negative  coefficient,  will keep unemployment 
above  its equilibrium  for  many  years  in succession,  until  inflationary  expec- 
tations  subside  and thus raise  mt -  w't to its full-employment  level. In the 
modern  Keynesian  theory,  monetary  authorities  are capable  of sustained 
contractionary  policies;  its attraction  is its apparent  ability  to explain  the 
persistence  of unemployment  as a result  of such  policies  on the part  of the 
monetary  authorities. 
Theorists  of rational  expectations,  especially  Robert  Lucas,  have  pointed 
out a fundamental  logical  flaw  in the Keynesian  position.4  Inflationary  ex- 
pectations  are formed  by intelligent  people,  who ought  to take advantage 
of all information  available  about  the economy  when  they  make  their  plans. 
As shown  below,  rational  expectations  implies  the following  reduced  form 
for the unemployment  rate: 
(9)  rational-expectations reduced form: ut =  u* +  et  -  Pt 
The random  variable,  vt,  is the difference  between  the actual  and expected 
wage  levels.  According  to the theory  of rational  expectations,  Vt is uncorre- 
lated  with any variable  whose  value is known  at the time expectations  are 
formed,  including  its own past  values.  The theory  implies  that  the reduced 
form  for unemployment  contains  only  random  variables.  Because  it is non- 
classical  in recognizing  the sluggishness  of wage adjustment,  it is capable 
of explaining  the existence  of unemployment  in any particular  year.  How- 
ever,  the theory  explains  persistent movements  in the unemployment  rate 
only  by relabeling  them  as shifts  in the Phillips  curve;  Vt  is not permitted  to 
move  persistently  at all, so the entire  burden  falls  on persistent  movements 
of et,  the random  shift in the wage-adjustment  equation.  The relative  im- 
portance  of the two random  variables  is examined  in a later  section. 
The  present  state  of the two major  macroeconomic  theories  may  be sum- 
marized  as follows: Keynesian  theory  is favored  by practical  economists 
and policymakers.  It seems  to give a reasonable  account  of the important 
3. A decade  ago, Keynesians  relied  heavily  on persistently  contractionary  fiscal  policy 
(fiscal drag) to explain persistent  unemployment.  Since then, Keynesian  models have 
been refined  to reduce  the impact of fiscal policy through  "crowding  out." 
4. See Robert E. Lucas,  Jr., "Econometric  Testing  of the Natural  Rate Hypothesis," 
in Otto Eckstein,  ed., The  Econometrics  of Price Determination,  A Conference  sponsored 
by the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  and Social Science  Research 
Council  (Board  of Governors,  1972),  pp. 50-59. Robert  E. Hall  307 
facts  about  unemployment  and to support  the view that monetary  policy 
has a substantial  and lasting  impact  on the unemployment  rate. On the 
other  hand,  the basic  hypothesis  of rational  expectations  has considerable 
logical  force  and has appealed  to an important  segment  of theorists.  The 
task facing  students  of unemployment  and wage  adjustment  is to create  a 
logically  consistent  theory  capable  of squaring  the Keynesian  facts  of slug- 
gish wage adjustment  and persistent  unemployment  with the persuasive 
criticisms  of the  rational-expectations  school  based  on the  behavior  of intel- 
ligent economic  agents.  This paper devotes  most of its attention  to that 
task. 
THE ROLE OF NOMINAL WAGES IN  REAL AGGREGATE DEMAND 
In an economy  with a predetermined  nominal  money supply,  the per- 
sistence  of unemployment  derives  from the rigidity  of nominal wages- 
that  is, in times  of high  unemployment,  a reduction  in money  wages  would 
restore  full employment.  This proposition  was the subject  of heated  con- 
troversy  in the past, and even today some macroeconomists  are skeptical 
of the stimulative  effects  of wage  cuts (typically,  they also deny  that wage 
cuts would ever occur  in the first  place).  The bulk of empirical  evidence, 
however,  demonstrates  a connection  between  the money  wage and aggre- 
gate  real output  whose  strength  may be inadequately  appreciated  by mod- 
ern Keynesian  economists.  Because  the central  argument  of this paper 
rests  on the hypothesis  that  the sluggishness  of wages  accounts  for the per- 
sistence  of unemployment,  the evidence  on the connection  of wages  to real 
output  and unemployment  is worth  study  at this point. 
The first  step on the logical  path from wages  to unemployment  is from 
wages to prices.  Research  on the determination  of prices  has converged 
toward  the simple  view  that  prices  are  proportional  to costs.  Wages  are  by 
far the largest  component  of costs, although  recent  experience  has high- 
lighted  the importance  of prices  of raw  materials  and  agricultural  inputs  as 
well. Modern  price  equations  have a measure  of wages  (usually  adjusted 
for the trend  of productivity  but not for its cyclical  variation)  as the domi- 
nant right-hand  variable.5  Price and wage inflation  take place simulta- 
neously.  Except  for a smooth  trend  and, recently,  the effects  of variations 
in other  real factor  prices,  there  has been essentially  no variation  in real 
5. See James  Tobin, "The Wage-Price  Mechanism:  Overview  of the Conference,"  in 
Eckstein,  ed., Econometrics  of Price Determiniation,  pp. 5-15. 308  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
wages.6  Rigidity  of wages  brings  about  a corresponding  rigidity  of prices. 
The next step is the connection  between  the price level and aggregate 
output.  In the simple  quantity  theory  the two are  exactly  inversely  propor- 
tional;  the  nominal  quantity  of money  multiplied  by velocity  is the  constant 
of proportionality.  If the money stock remains  constant,  a reduction  of 
1 percent  in the price  level  raises  real  GNP by 1 percent.  At the other  end  of 
the spectrum  is the extreme  Keynesian  model, in which the demand  for 
money  is highly  interest  elastic  and aggregate  demand  is unresponsive  to 
interest  rates.  A reduction  in prices  causes  interest  rates  to fall  but  has  little 
effect  on real  GNP. The  structure  of contemporary  macroeconomic  models 
admits  both of these extremes  as special  cases.  The interest  elasticities  of 
the demand  for money  and of aggregate  expenditure  are  estimated  empiri- 
cally, and the behavior  of the models  lies part way between  those of the 
quantity  and the extreme  Keynesian  theories. 
Among  the large  macroeconomic  models,  the MIT-Pennsylvania-Social 
Science  Research  Council  (MPS)  model  has investigated  these  issues  most 
carefully.  In the MPS model, the interest  elasticity  of the demand for 
money  is fairly  low-0.06  in the short  run,  0.08  in the  long  run.7  Changes  in 
prices  cause large  changes  in interest  rates  in the same direction.  Falling 
interest  rates stimulate  expenditure  through  two principal  channels:  the 
increase  in demand  for  investment  goods,  housing,  and  consumer  durables; 
and  the  increase  in consumption,  stimulated  by the increase  in wealth  in the 
stock market.  (There is also a small stimulus  to consumption  because 
money  is a part  of wealth-the Pigou  effect.)  Missing  from  the MPS  model 
is a third  channel  whose  importance  is increasingly  recognized.8  When  in- 
6. The view that excessive  unemployment  could be attributed  to a level of real  wages 
that is too high was widespread  before Keynes.  The General  Theory  seems to have dis- 
posed of the view; see John Maynard  Keynes, The General  Theory  of Employment, 
Interest  and  Money  (Harcourt,  Brace, 1936).  The roles of nominal  and real wages in the 
theory of disequilibrium  are discussed clearly and thoroughly by Robert Barro and 
Herschel  Grossman,  "A General  Disequilibrium  Model of Income and Employment," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol. 61 (March 1971), pp. 82-93. They conclude that the 
fundamental  cause of disequilibrium  is an inappropriate  level of prices and nominal 
wages, and that the real wage determines  only the market  in which the disequilibrium 
appears. 
7. See "Equations  in the MIT-Penn-SSRC  Econometric  Model of the United States" 
(Massachusetts  Institute of  Technology, Department of  Economics, January 1975; 
processed),  sec. 15. 
8. See, for example,  Ronald McKinnon, "The Limited Role of Fiscal Policy in an 
Open Economy"  (paper presented  at the Conference  on the Monetary  Mechanism  in 
Open Economies,  Helsinki,  Finland,  August 1975; processed). Robert  E. Hall  309 
terest  rates  fall in the United States,  foreigners  will increase  their  borrow- 
ing. Since  capital  flows and trade  flows must always  sum exactly  to zero, 
every  dollar  loaned  to foreigners  must  be accompanied  by a dollar  increase 
in U.S. net exports.  The demand  for net exports  is interest  elastic  as a con- 
sequence  of this  process.  The omission  of the third  channel  biases  the MPS 
model toward understating  the expansionary  effect of wage reductions 
and thus toward  understating  the cost of wage rigidity  in terms of per- 
sistent  unemployment. 
In the MPS model, a one-time  reduction  of 1 percent  in all prices  and 
wages  raises  real  GNP by about  0.1 percent  within  one quarter.9  The effect 
grows  rapidly,  reaching  0.7 percent  after one year and achieving  its peak 
of about 1.5 percent  in eight  quarters.  Except  for the lags, the MPS  model 
is more like the quantity  theory  than like the extreme  Keynesian  theory. 
Within  the model, persistent  unemployment  would not exist if wages  ad- 
justed  rapidly.  The  model  is Keynesian  in embodying  sluggish  wage  adjust- 
ment,  but distinctly  non-Keynesian  in implying  a quick  return  to full em- 
ployment  after  a reduction  in nominal  wages.  Addition  of an equation  for 
net export  demand  that  was  properly  sensitive  to interest  rates  would  make 
the MPS model  even  less Keynesian  in the second  respect. 
Perhaps  the major  qualification  to the argument  that wage reductions 
could stimulate  employment  is that deflation  brings  about  expectations  of 
further  deflation,  and  these  expectations  inhibit  the expansion  of demand.'0 
Symmetrically,  inflation  should stimulate  demand  through  the same pro- 
cess and lessen  the impact  of wage increases  in reducing  excess  demand. 
Buyers  will postpone  purchasing  durable  goods if they expect  them to be 
cheaper  in the future  and  will  hoard  them  if they  expect  their  prices  to rise. 
Within  modern  Keynesian  theory,  business  investment  is the component  of 
demand  that is viewed  as most sensitive  to price  expectations.  The MPS 
9. These effects were inferred  indirectly  from solutions of the current  version  of the 
model. Because  the model has a great many exogenous  variables  specified  in nominal 
terms, it is not possible to compute the impact of wage and price reductions  directly. 
Instead,  the solutions  increased  the money  supply.  The homogeneity  of the model makes 
an increase  in the money  supply  equivalent  to a reduction  in wages  and prices,  under  the 
assumption  that the wage and price cut does not feed back through  the expectations 
equations.  The model has essentially  no lag between  prices  and wages. 
10. This issue is discussed  by James Tobin, "Keynesian  Models of  Recession and 
Depression,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 65 (May 1975), pp. 195-202. As Tobin 
points out, an unfavorable  expectation  effect is not even certain  as a theoretical  matter. 
Here I do not disagree  with Tobin's  analysis,  but merely  present  evidence  that the effect 
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investment  equation  embodies  the view that a downward  shift of 1 per- 
centage  point in the expected  rate of inflation  has the same discouraging 
effect  on investment  as an increase  of 1 percentage  point in the nominal 
interest  rate.  However,  expectations  respond  to the history  of inflation  or 
deflation  with such a long lag that the immediate  sharp  response  of the 
nominal  interest  rate  to a change  in the price  level is offset  only to a small 
extent  by a shift  in expectations.  In other  words,  in the MPS  model  a wage- 
price reduction  (or monetary  expansion)  has a pronounced  downward 
effect  on real  interest  rates.  In turn,  demand  depends  on real  interest  rates 
and  responds  to a 1 percent  reduction  in wages  and  prices  only  slightly  less 
than  it does to a 1 percent  increase  in the money supply.  Keynesian  con- 
cerns  about  the adverse  effects  of deflation  operating  through  expectations 
are  not sustained  by the MPS model. 
This  brief  study  suggests  that  the  connection  between  unemployment  and 
wages  is the place  to look for an explanation  of persistent  unemployment. 
The economy  would behave  in a thoroughly  classical  manner  if only the 
short-run  Phillips  curve  were  much  steeper.  The  study  equally  confirms  the 
view  that monetary  expansion  is a swift and sure corrective  for excessive 
unemployment.  Even with rapid  wage adjustment,  only a concern  about 
inflation  would  cause  policymakers  to choose laissez-faire  over monetary 
expansion  as a response  to an unemployment  shock. 
Microeconomic  Disequilibrium  Theory 
Dissatisfaction  with  the lack of theoretical  explanations  of the sluggish- 
ness  of wage  adjustments  has  led economists  to study  the  behavior  of wages 
and  unemployment  in an atomistic  labor  market.  Many  have argued  that, 
in a market  with many  small  employers  and independent  workers,  wages 
do not react  instantly  to excess  supply  or demand  because  of the time it 
takes  for information  to spread."  Employers  do not take immediate  ad- 
vantage  of a slackening  in demand  by reducing  wage offers  because  they 
become  aware  only  gradually  that  workers  have  become  more  readily  avail- 
able.  Similarly,  workers  continue  to hold out for  the  kind  of  job they  would 
have been able to get under normal  conditions.  The initial impact of a 
reduction  in demand  is an increase  in unemployment.  Later,  wages fall, 
11. See Robert E. Hall, "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market,"  BPEA, 
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stimulating  demand  and  reducing  unemployment  to its normal  level.  While 
information  is diffusing  through  the labor market,  nonclassical  quantity 
adjustments  take place, but in the longer  run the market  behaves  classi- 
cally.'2  This  modern  theory  of disequilibrium  is quantitatively  at odds  with 
the facts of persistent  unemployment.  When unemployment  has been ex- 
cessive  for several  years  running,  how can employers  remain  unaware  of 
the bargains  in the  labor  market  in the form  of high-quality  workers  willing 
to take  lower  wages?  How can workers  remain  unaware  that  jobs are  hard 
to find so that reservation  wages should be cut? When it is universally 
predicted  that labor  markets  will be extremely  tight, why don't  employers 
recruit  effectively  by raising  wage  offers?  Why don't  workers  avoid  taking 
new  jobs prematurely  by raising  their  reservation  wages?  The strong  per- 
sistence  of unemployment  implies  that the diffusion  of information  within 
the labor  market  can take five years  or more,  which  seems  altogether  im- 
plausible.  The theory  of disequilibrium  is well formulated  and internally 
consistent,  but its relevance  to the actual behavior  of the United States 
economy  is open to serious  question. 
Persistent  Unemployment  in the Theory  of Rational  Expectations 
The criticism  of modern  theories  of the Phillips  curve  just sketched  is 
sharpest  within the framework  of rational  expectations.  As mentioned 
above, within  a two-equation  model similar  to the one discussed  at the 
beginning  of this paper,  Sargent  discussed  a Phillips  curve  embodying  ra- 
tional expectations  in which  unemployment  can persist,  though  the main 
focus of the paper  is on other  issues  and the persistence  of unemployment 
is not addressed  specifically.'3  The role of the aggregate-demand  equation 
in the rational-expectations  model  is simply  to contribute  to the surprise  in 
the disturbance.  Thus, the starting  point for my purposes  is the wage- 
adjustment  equation: 
12. Axel Leijonhufvud,  On Keynesian  Economics  and the Economics  of Keynes: A 
Study  in Monetary  Theory  (London: Oxford  University  Press, 1968), pt. 2, argues  that 
modern disequilibrium  theory is really what Keynes had in mind. Keynes carefully 
avoided  blaming  unemployment  on labor  unions  (see, for example,  General  Theory,  p. 9). 
He also subscribed  to the modern  view of the Phillips  curve  that wage adjustment  takes 
time and that strict rigidity  of wages is a useful assumption  only in the short run (see 
ibid., pp. 247-51). 
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(5)  Wt  -  Wt-i  =  -01(tt  -  U*)  +  WVt  -  Wt-1  +  Et. 
The natural, or equilibrium, rate occurs when wt =  v,, or 
(10)  _t  =  t 
'1 
The  random  disturbance  shifts  the equilibrium  rate.  Now, the criterion  for 
rationality  of rvt  is that  it be an unbiased  predictor  of the actual  wage,  given 
all the information  available  just before  period  t, say bt: 
(I11)  wVt  =  E(wt I  bt). 
This  implies  that  wg  and vt differ  by a random  forecast  error,  vt, that obeys 
E(v, I  bt) =  0; bt contains  no information  about  vt, for if it did,  the informa- 
tion could be used to improve  wt.  The error  vt is uncorrelated  with every- 
thing  known  before  t, including  particularly  its own lagged  values.  Purely 
random  serially  uncorrelated  errors  of expectations  are  the central  implica- 
tion of the theory  of rational  expectations.  Inserting  the forecast  error  in 
the Phillips  curve  gives 
(12)  t  =  -1(Ut-  u*)  +  Et. 
As an equation  explaining  unemployment,  this is 
Et 
= *+s-  Vt  (9)  t  +  1 
b1 
(13)  U*  Vt 
The unemployment  rate  differs  from  its equilibrium  value  by a serially  un- 
correlated  purely random disturbance, -  vt/ll.  If Et were also serially uncor- 
related,  then ut  itself would  fluctuate  in a purely  random  serially  uncorre- 
lated fashion  around  its mean, u*. Lucas  has pointed  out this implication 
of rational  expectations,'4  but the data show the implication  to be totally 
false.  Unemployment  is highly  serially  correlated. 
Sargent's  modification  of Lucas'  work  provides  a model that describes 
the facts about unemployment  more satisfactorily.  He suggests  that the 
random  shift of the Phillips  curve,  Et, may be serially  correlated,  implying 
that the persistence  of unemployment  arises  from  persistence  of the shifts. 
But this is no more  than a relabeling  of the same  phenomenon:  the theory 
proposed by Lucas and Sargent contains no  explanation whatever of  the 
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persistence of unemployment  but merely  identifies  it with an unexplained 
shift in the equation  that describes  unemployment.  The central  contribu- 
tion of their theory  is its demonstration  that in an economy  of rational 
agents,  the  part  of unemployment  that  is explained  by the tradeoff  between 
inflation  and  unemployment  is totally  random  and  unpredictable.  The  pre- 
dictable  component  of unemployment  (as well as part  of the unpredictable 
component  associated  with  the unpredictable  part  of Et) must  be explained 
by forces  not considered  in their  theory. 
From  the stochastic  behavior  of the unemployment  rate one can calcu- 
late  bounds  on the fraction  of its total  variation  that  is attributable  to infla- 
tionary or deflationary  surprises  and on the remaining  fraction  that is 
attributable  to shifts  of the Phillips  curve.'5  The first  step is to rewrite  the 
model  in a form  that  makes  explicit  the distinction  between  the two sources 
of fluctuations  in unemployment.  The problem  is that part of v, is the 
instantaneous  response  of the economy  to the unexpected  fluctuation  in 
Et-shifts  of the Phillips  curve  are one possible  source  of inflationary  sur- 
prises.  The  unexpected  wage  fluctuation  can  be separated  into two uncorre- 
lated components:  v',  the component  caused by unexpected  monetary 
policy and other unexpected  developments  not arising  from the Phillips 
curve,  and a residual  that  is a multiple  of the unexpected  component  of Et. 
Then the unemployment  equation  can be written 
I  I 
(14)  ut =  u* +  Et -Vt 
(114 
Here  E'  is the shift  of the Phillips  curve  net of the compensating  response  in 
vt, and  v4  is Yt net of the same  compensating  response.  I will  assume  that  the 
net  inflationary  surprise,  vt, is uncorrelated  with  the net shift,  Et. This  is rea- 
sonable  if the major  sources  of unexpected  inflationary  shocks  are mone- 
tary or fiscal  policy,  surprises  in world  markets,  or unexpected  changes  in 
demand.  None of these  should  shift  the Phillips  curve  directly.  The  compu- 
tation  of the bound  on the fraction  of the variance  contributed  by v4 starts 
from the observation  that a second-order  autoregressive  equation  gives 
quite an accurate  prediction  of the unemployment  rate. The variance  of 
tIcannot be any larger  than the variance  around  this prediction  equation 
and in fact must be substantially  smaller;  the prediction  error  contains 
lagged  values of the serially  uncorrelated  vt as wel as the unpredictable 
15. I am indebted  to Christopher  Sims for pointing  out an error  in an earlier  version 
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part  of E'. The  predicted  deviation  of the unemployment  rate  from  its mean, 
UT, is 
(15)  Xl(Ut-  -u*)  +  X2(Ut-2  -  u*) 
The forecast  error,  Zt, is then 
(16)  Zt  =  Ut -  U*-  Xl(Ut-1  -U*)-  X2(Ut2  -  U*). 
The variance  of the forecast  error  is 
(17)  2  =  (1  +  X2 +  X2)U2,'/41  +  V(e-  - 
The  term  surrounded  by the Vis the  unpredictable  part  of the  random  shift, 
E'. Its variance  must  be positive,  so 
c2  >  (1  +  X2 +  X2)0f2,/q5, 
or 
2 
v  /1  +  X2 +  XV 
For quarterly  data for the United States  from 1954 through  1974, o-  iS 
0.090, with X1  =  1.57 and X2 =  -0.65.16  These results  imply that  -2,/q52 
cannot  exceed  0.023. By contrast,  the variance  of unemployment  is 1.35. 
Only a trivialfraction,  less than  1.7 percent, of the variation  of unemployment 
is attributable  to the unemployment-inflation  tradeoff  in the rational-expecta- 
tions model. The remaining 98.3 percent or more is attributable to unex- 
plained shifts of the Phillips curve. 
Another  Theory  of the Phillips  Curve 
Some other theories of the Phillips curve do not embody explicitly the 
sharp assumptions of rational expectations, yet claim to  explain the re- 
sponse of wages to unemployment as the outcome of the meeting of rational 
buyers and sellers in the labor market. The model presented in "The Pro- 
cess of Inflation" (hereafter, the PI model) falls into this category. It now 
appears  that the criticism  just directed  at the rational-expectations  model 
applies  to other  models  as well: they are  unable  to explain  the persistence 
16. That is, the standard  error of the regression  of the unemployment  rate on its 
level lagged  once and lagged  twice  is 0.30. The regression  coefficients  are 1.57  and -0.65. 
Very  similar  results  are reported  by Sargent,  "Rational  Expectations,"  p. 451. A regres- 
sion is just a convenient  way to get reasonable  values for Xi  and X2. The resulting  bound 
on  c2,/OJ  does not require  that it  actualy  obey a second-order  autoregressive  process; 
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of unemployment.  They treat  it as a surprise  to participants  in the labor 
market,  yet most deviations  of the unemployment  rate from equilibrium 
are highly  predictable.  The point where  this defect  enters  the PI model is 
particularly  easy  to identify,  but I believe  the difficulty  exists  in all models. 
In the PI model,  the crucial  step in wage  determination  is the setting  of 
the scale  wage  by employers.  Their  goal  is a scale  wage  just high  enough  to 
attract  the desired  grade  of worker  into each  job category.  Firms never 
expect  upgrading  or downgrading  of the labor  force,  since  they  prefer  that 
these  movements  not occur  and can offset  any expected  one by an adjust- 
ment of the scale wage. Consequently,  all movements  are totally unpre- 
dictable  and uncorrelated  with past movements  or any other  information 
available  at the time  wages  are  set. If up- or downgrading  has a stable  rela- 
tionship  with  the unemployment  rate,  as hypothesized  in the PI model,  this 
feature  of wage determination  implies  that firms  never  expect  the unem- 
ployment  rate to deviate  from its equilibrium  level. Either  firms  remain 
ignorant  year  after  year  of widely  reported  conditions  in the labor  market, 
or the relation  between  the unemployment  rate  and up- and downgrading 
of the labor force shifts over time. To maintain  its claim to be a theory 
based on rational  behavior,  the PI model  must  make  the second  assump- 
tion. But this makes  it exactly  like the rational-expectations  model, at- 
tributing  an overwhelming  fraction  of the variation  in unemployment  to 
unexplained  changes  in the equilibrium  unemployment  rate  (the decompo- 
sition of the variance  of the unemployment  rate in the previous  section 
applies  to the PI model  as well). 
Keynesian  Theories of Wage Rigidity 
In its modern interpretation, Keynes' General  Theory  is a working out of 
the macroeconomic implications of the short-run inflexibility of wages. Its 
major innovation, the theory of effective demand, makes economic sense 
only when  wages  are  fixed.  Keynes  accepted  wage  rigidity  and  even  argued 
its desirability.  Falling wages in a contraction  might only further  desta- 
bilize the economy, he claimed. Chapter 19 of the General  Theory  argues at 
length against the view that falling nominal wages could cure a depression.'7 
The modern evidence reviewed earlier suggests that Keynes was quite mis- 
17. The argument  rests on two main reasons:  (1) wages would fall more than prices, 
and the marginal  propensity  to spend profits  is less than that for wages; (2) deflation 
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taken in this respect. The durability of Keynesian economics arises from 
the truth of the hypothesis of wage rigidity and the usefulness of the theory 
of effective demand it implies. Keynes' error on the purely hypothetical 
question of what would happen if wages were  flexible hardly diminishes the 
importance of the General Theory, because wages are in fact not  at all 
flexible. 
To the reader who takes the economic theory of supply and demand 
seriously, it is curious that the General  Theory  lacks any fundamental expla- 
nation for the failure of the wage to vary in order to clear the labor market. 
The lack has a good historical explanation. The General  Theory  was in large 
part a reaction against influential books by A. C. Pigou and Lionel Rob- 
bins, who attributed  unemployment to rigid wages and advocated measures 
to increase competition in the labor market to alleviate the depression."8 
Keynes' major goal was to demonstrate the inadequacy of this prescription. 
A lasting contribution of the General  Theory was its demonstration of the 
fallacy of the simple view that reduction of the nominal wage would stimu- 
late the demand for labor directly by lowering the real wage. He empha- 
sized that changes in nominal wages have essentially no effect on real wages 
(a view strongly supported by modern research),  and that the stimulus from 
wage cuts acts more indirectly. Under flexible wages, Keynes wrote, 
the wage-unit  might have to fall without limit until it reached a point where 
the effect of the abundance  of money in terms of the wage-unit  on the rate of 
interest  was sufficient  to restore  a level of full employment.  At no other point 
could there  be a resting-place.'9 
This is an exact description of the central mechanism restoring full employ- 
ment in, for example, the MPS model. 
From his classical predecessors, Keynes inherited the notion that wages 
were inflexible because they are set by monopolists in the labor market- 
that is, by labor unions. Since this view is widespread today, it is worth a 
careful examination. Without doubt, wages are more sluggish when they 
are negotiated than when they are set in a competitive market. The question 
is whether concentration in the labor market can account for an important 
fraction of the persistent movements of unemployment. Can the slow re- 
sponse of unions explain the six straight years of excessive unemployment, 
1958 through 1963? Can it explain the seven straight years of low unem- 
18. Respectively,  The  Theory of  Unemployment (London:  MacMillan,  1933),  and 
The  Great  Depression  (MacMillan,  1934). 
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ployment  from 1964 through  1970?  The second question  is a particular 
obstacle  for superficially  plausible  explanations. 
The view that labor unions are the mnajor  source of the pathological 
behavior  of wages  and unemployment  has three  major  flaws: 
1. The  logic of monopoly  does not make  wages  rigid.  Every  monopolist 
faces a negative  tradeoff  between  price and quantity.  Even labor unions 
with full power  to dictate  wages  are restrained  by the downward-sloping 
demand  function  for their  members;  if they were  not, they would set an 
infinite  wage. 
2. Collective  bargaining  does not in fact  fix the wage.  Elaborate  institu- 
tional  provisions  are  made  for adaptation  to changes  in demand  not fore- 
seen  at the time  of negotiation.  Effective  wages  vary  in response  to demand 
through  upward  and downward  movements  of workers  among  job catego- 
ries, variations  in overtime,  and other  mechanisms. 
3. Collective-bargaining  agreements  cover only a fraction  of the labor 
force,  perhaps  25 percent.  In the  rest  of the economy,  employers  are  largely 
unfettered.  When demand  falls, wages  should  fall in the nonunion  sector 
until all the excess  supply  of labor is absorbed  and unemployment  is re- 
stored  to its normal  level.  No matter  what  they  do to union  wages,  unions 
cannot  cause  unemployment  unless  they control  all wages. 
The first of these flaws involves the deep and unsettled  issue of the 
motivation  of labor  unions  and  will not be discussed  any further  here.  The 
second was developed  and documented  at considerable  length in "The 
Process  of Inflation"  and also will receive  no further  attention  here.  The 
third  flaw  is equally  important.  Its resolution  will occupy  most of the latter 
parts  of the paper. 
In a standard  two-sector  model in which  the wage  is fixed  in one sector 
and  flexible  in the other,  unemployment  is impossible.  Wages  will  fall  in the 
competitive  sector  until  unemployment  disappears,  simply  because  the un- 
employed  would  rather  be working  at some positive  wage  than be unem- 
ployed at zero wage. Labor  unions can cause wage differentials  but not 
unemployment  as long as there  is a competitive  sector  able  to pay  a positive 
wage.  The  wage  rigidity  identified  earlier  in the  paper  as the basic  source  of 
persistent  unemployment  must be universal.  The presence  of persistent 
unemployment  in an economy  in which  firms  employing  75 percent  of the 
work  force  are  unfettered  by collective  bargaining  can  be explained  only  by 
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Idiosyncratic  Exchange  in the Labor  Market 
The  theory  of idiosyncratic  exchange  is a very  recent  attempt  to supply  a 
rationale  for the apparent  rigidity  of wages  in an atomistic  labor  market.20 
In the spirit of the microeconomic  theory of disequilibrium,  this theory 
attempts  to explain  wage  rigidity  as the outcome  of the rational  activities 
of buyers  and sellers  in the labor  market,  each of whom  controls  an infini- 
tesimal  share  of the total demand  or supply.  However,  the theory  does not 
depend  on lack of information  on the part of either  buyers  or sellers,  and 
so is not subject  to the theoretical  or empirical  criticisms  of the previous 
section  of this paper. 
The  central  hypothesis  of the theory  of idiosyncratic  exchange  holds  that 
an important  part  of the  product  of a worker  is the  return  to specific  human 
capital.  A worker  produces  more  in his present  job than  he would  as an in- 
experienced  employee  of another  firm.  Under  competition,  there  is a "zone 
of indeterminacy"  (in Okun's  words)  within  which  the wage can vary: a 
worker  will quit if paid less than the wage of inexperienced  workers  else- 
where,  but  the current  employer  should  be willing  to pay  up to the worker's 
marginal  product,  if necessary.  To avoid  costly  bargaining  with  individual 
workers  over  the division  of the return  to specific  capital,  institutions  have 
evolved  for treating  workers  equitably  and  in a way  that  is well  understood 
from  the beginning  of their  employment.  Unexpected  wage  changes  would 
be a violation  of these  rules.  Wages  continue  on a smooth  trajectory,  with 
labor  getting  a larger  share  of the return  to specific  capital  when  the market 
is slack and employers  the larger  share  when demand  is strong.  Unlike 
many  casual  rationalizations  of wage  rigidity,  this  theory  explains  both the 
failure of wages to rise rapidly in tight markets and their downward 
rigidity. 
The proponents  of the theory  of idiosyncratic  exchange  do not claim  to 
explain  wage  rigidity  throughout  the economy.  For many  sectors-trade, 
20. The term is due to Oliver E. Williamson,  Michael L. Wachter,  and Jeffrey  E. 
Harris,  "Understanding  the Employment  Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic  Ex- 
change," Bell Journal of Economics,  vol. 6 (Spring 1975), pp. 250-78, which draws 
extensively  on Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal  Labor Markets and 
Manpower  Analysis  (Heath, 1971). Arthur Okun applies this body of thought to the 
problem  of wage rigidity  in his paper  in this issue,  "Inflation:  Its Mechanics  and Welfare 
Costs." Another related  attempt  to create  a theory of rigidity  is John Hicks, The Crisis 
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services,  construction  are important  examples-and many occupations- 
some  professionals,  clerical  workers,  drivers,  craft  workers,  laborers-the 
character  of the employment  relation  is rather  different  from  that  described 
by the theory.  As in the case  of unions,  the theory  that  wage  rigidity  results 
from idiosyncratic  exchange  requires  a complementary  theory of trans- 
mission  to the competitive  sector. 
Empirical  Evidence  on Wage  Rigidity  by Sector 
The importance  of the various considerations  that account for rigid 
wages in particular  sectors  is a matter  for empirical  determination.  To 
study the cyclical  behavior  of relative  wages,  I have fitted the following 
simple  model  to wage  data for fourteen  sectors: 
(18)  wit -  t =  ai  +  Xit +  Oi(ut -  i7) +  fit, 
where 
Wit  =  the log of the annual earnings of full-time equivalent workers 
in sector  i and year  t 
wt = the average  level of the log of wages  in year t 
oxi  = the permanent  differential  of sector  i from  the common  level 
Xi = the trend  relative  to the average 
fi  = the cyclical  response  of the differential 
ut -  u  =  the departure of the log of the aggregate fixed-weight unem- 
ployment  rate2'  from  its average  level 
c-t=  a random disturbance. 
Estimates  for the model appear  in table 1. 
Industries  with  high  values  of A have unresponsive  wages.  The largest  3 
is for  the federal  government,  with  medicine  and  education,  transportation, 
and  communication  (almost  entirely  the  telephone  industry)  not far  behind. 
The remaining  regulated  industry,  utilities,  has a smaller  but still unam- 
biguously  positive  f. In five industries-state and local government,  min- 
ing, durables  and nondurables  manufacturing,  and construction,  the hy- 
pothesis  that  A is zero  cannot  be rejected  statistically.  The cyclical  behavior 
of wages  in these industries  roughly  parallels  the economy-wide  average. 
The remaining  four sectors,  retail trade,  wholesale  trade,  finance,  insur- 
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Table 1. Regression  Results for Cyclical Behavior  of Wage Differentials, 
by Major Industry,  1962-73a 
Constant  Cyclical  Time 
differential  differential  trend  Standard 
Industry  c  X  error 
Nonentrepreneurial 
Federal government  0.35  0.076  0.011  0.013 
(0.01)  (0.017)  (0.001) 
Medicine  and education  -0.26  0.055  0.013  0.006 
(0.01)  (0.008)  (0.001) 
Transportation  0.31  0.044  0.006  0.011 
(0.01)  (0.015)  (0.001) 
Communication  0.12  0.044  0.000  0.021 
(0.02)  (0.028)  (0.002) 
Utilities  0.24  0.018  0.000  0.003 
(0.00)*  (0.005)  (0.000) 
State and local  government  0.05  0.004  0.006  0.009 
(0.01)  (0.012)  (0.001) 
Entrepreneurial 
Mining  0.22  0.012  0.005  0.007 
(0.01)  (0.010)  (0.001) 
Nondurables  manufacturing  -0.05  -0.005  -0.005  0.002 
(0.00)*  (0.003)  (0.OOO)t 
Durables  manufacturing  0.12  -0.007  -0.007  0.006 
(0.00)*  (0.008)  (0. 000)t 
Construction  0.21  -0.018  0.004  0.019 
(0.01)  (0.025)  (0.002) 
Retail  trade  -0.30  -0.018  -0.011  0.004 
(0.OO)*  (0.005)  (0. 000)t 
Wholesale  trade  0.21  -0.021  -0.004  0.003 
(0.00)*  (0.004)  (0.000)t 
Finance,  insurance, and real estate  0.06  -0.029  -0.001  0.003 
(0.01)  (0.011)  (0.001) 
Services  -0.19  -0.038  0.000  0.010 
(0.01)  (0.013)  (0.001) 
Sources: Derived from text equation (18). The basic wage data are from the national income and product 
accounts, table 6.5, "average annual earnings per full-time employee by industry," appearing in Survey 
of Current  Business,  vol. 54 (July 1974), p. 37, and the various summary  volumes of the national income and 
product accounts published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are standard errors. 
* Less than 0.005. 
t  Less than 0.0005. 
ance, and real estate, and services (other than medical-educational), have 
wages that are clearly more responsive than the average. 
The view of cyclical variations in wage differentials that emerges from 
table 1 is quite different from the stereotypes of most theoretical discus- Robert  E. Hall  321 
sions. Capital-intensive  unionized industries are hardly the major source of 
rigid wages. On the other hand, the results are not totally incompatible 
with the two theories of sectoral rigidity discussed earlier. Several of the 
rigid-wage  industries  are highly unionized, while none of the clearly  flexible 
industries is substantially unionized. The one industry with an unambigu- 
ously high component of specific human capital, communication, does in 
fact have inflexible wages. However, the most notable feature of the results 
is suggested by the ranking of industries  by their wage responsiveness: non- 
businesses are unresponsive and businesses are responsive. The nonentre- 
preneurial  sector-government,  nonprofit institutions, and regulated  indus- 
tries-is  precisely the rigid-wage sector. My main purpose here is simply to 
point out the role of this sector in wage determination, not to explain its 
behavior from more fundamental considerations. Doubtless, a variety of 
explanations are important, including the degree of unionization of the 
sector and the nature of the relations between workers and employers. My 
own belief is that the insulation of this sector from arbitrage is paramount 
in the explanation. In the entrepreneurial  sector, a business that does not 
take full advantage of the opportunity to reduce wage costs in a recession, 
or to keep its workers  in a boom by raising wages speedily, will be displaced 
by a more profitable firm that has a more timely and aggressive wage 
policy. But nobody is permitted to displace governments or the telephone 
company, whose wage policies are thus insulated from the basic force of 
competition. 
The Transmission  of Wage Rigidity 
Previous sections have discussed two theoretical reasons for wage rigidity 
in specific sectors of the economy: collective bargaining in the unionized 
sector, and institutions for dividing the return to  specific capital in the 
idiosyncratic-exchange sector.  Quantitatively, rigid wages are most  im- 
portant in the nonentrepreneurial  sector, which employs 34 percent of the 
labor force. As  emphasized earlier, the mere existence of  any  of  these 
sectors does not explain the rigidity of the overall wage level or the per- 
sistence of unemployment. Workers who cannot find jobs  in any of the 
three overlapping rigid-wage sectors should take jobs  that require little 
specific capital with nonunion entrepreneurial  firms. There are many such 
jobs and there would be even more if the unemployed were to bid the wage 322  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1975 
Competitive  wage  s 
DR  S  U 
wu  _ 
DR+DC 
Total employment 
down. Why does the competitive sector fail to absorb the unemployed? 
This section seeks an answer within a theory of wage rigidity in the residual 
or competitive sector induced by the presence of the rigid-wage sector. 
The essential argument that wage rigidity is transmitted from one sector 
to another appears in the accompanying diagram. Here the wage in the 
rigid-wage sector is considered a predetermined  constant, while supply and 
demand determine the competitive wage conditional on the value of the 
rigid wage. The demand for labor in the rigid-wage sector (DR) slopes up- 
ward to the right because the vertical axis gives the competitive wage level. 
If the labor market cleared in the ordinary way, then the competitive wage 
would be w*, the point where the demand schedule for both the rigid-wage 
and competitive sectors (DR +  DC) crosses the supply schedule for labor 
(S). Under ordinary market clearing, a higher rigid wage would imply a 
lower competitive wage, since the total demand schedule would lie to the 
left. The competitive wage compensates for the inappropriate level of the 
rigid wage. This is the basic argument, sketched earlier in the paper, that a 
rigid wage in one sector does not make the entire economy function as if 
the average wage level were rigid. 
Now, in fact, the labor market does not clear in the normal way. Unem- 
ployment is always present. If unemployment were simply a constant frac- Robert  E. Hall  323 
tion  of the labor force for frictional reasons, then the previous analysis 
would hold with no important modification. The possibility considered in 
the diagram, however, is that the amount of unemployment (U) may de- 
pend on the level of the competitive wage. This makes the net supply of 
labor (S  -  U) positively wage elastic, and makes the competitive wage (w.) 
less responsive to changes in the demand for labor. In particular, higher 
levels of the rigid wage are no longer fully compensated by lower levels of 
the competitive wage; rather, the higher the rigid wage, the higher is the 
unemployment rate. This is the basic theory of the role of a rigid-wage sec- 
tor in causing overall wage rigidity and excessive unemployment that is 
pursued in the remainder of this paper. 
The proposition illustrated in the diagram clearly rests on a theory of 
unemployment on the supply side. Before developing that theory in detail, 
I must emphasize that a theory of unemployment on the supply side is not 
a substitute or rival for the view that unemployment is a function of the 
level of demand for labor. The unemployment rate is determined by the 
interaction of supply and demand forces. The diagram illustrates a model 
within the framework developed in the introductory section of the paper: 
the demand schedule is the effective-demand  function considered as a func- 
tion of the wage rate, and the unemployment schedule is the wage-adjust- 
ment function, considered now as a relation between the unemployment 
rate and the current level of the wage. In fact, except for the distinction 
between the two sectors, the diagram illustrates  the standard contemporary 
macroeconomic model with an aggregate-demand  function and a Phillips 
curve. 
A substantial theoretical literature supports the hypothesis that unem- 
ployment rises when wage differentials widen.22  The theory rests on the 
view that unemployment is the result of conscious decisions by job seekers 
about the use of their time. According to this search theory, instead of 
22. Much of it starts  from John R. Harris  and Michael  P. Todaro,  "Migration,  Un- 
employment  and Development:  A Two-Sector  Analysis,"  American  Economic  Review, 
vol. 60 (March 1970), pp. 126-43; see especially Stephen A. Ross and Michael L. 
Wachter, "Wage Determination,  Inflation, and the Industrial  Structure,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 63 (September  1973), pp. 675-92. A recent contribution  with 
many  other  references  is B. Curtis  Eaton  and Philip  A. Neher,  "Unemployment,  Under- 
employment,  and Optimal Job Search,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  vol. 83 (April 
1975),  pp. 355-75. Empirical  support  for the hypothesis  that wage differentials  respond 
to the unemployment  rate is found in Michael  Wachter's  study of the cyclical  behavior 
of wages  in the manufacturing  sector.  See "Cyclical  Variations  in the Interindustry  Wage 
Structure,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 60 (March 1970),  pp. 75-84. These results 
for the manufacturing  sector are quantitatively  similar  to mine for the entire  economy. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
taking the first  job that becomes available, the unemployed decide whether 
a better  job might develop in the future, for which it might pay to wait.23 
When wage differentials  widen, the return to waiting increases on the aver- 
age, because the difference  between the wage for a good job and the wage of 
the average  job increases. In a recession, the unemployed do not take jobs 
immediately in the competitive sector at lower wages. Rather, they are 
aware that jobs still exist in the rigid-wage sector and some of them will 
decide to remain unemployed until they find a job  there. The wider the 
differential, the higher is the payoff to waiting. 
THE SUPPLY  OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Rational behavior on  the part of  the unemployed involves  sampling 
from the universe of  available jobs  and deciding after examining each 
prospect whether to take it or reject it in the hope that a better one will 
become available. Unemployment is a productive activity to the individual, 
so it does only slight violence to the economist's vocabulary to discuss the 
supply of unemployment.24  Earlier, in "The Process of Inflation," I set out 
the details of a representative model of the behavior of the unemployed. 
There, the dispersion of  prospective wages facing the unemployed was 
taken as a constant. The only important modification pursued here (and 
in more detail in the appendix) is the recognition that one of the deter- 
minants of the value of waiting to the unemployed is the probability of 
locating a job in the rigid-wage sector, and that the desirability of such a 
job depends on the relative wages paid by the two sectors. 
Suppose workers face a normal distribution of wage prospects in the 
competitive sector with mean ,  and standard deviation o1,  and similarly, a 
normal distribution in the rigid-wage sector with parameters /2  and  02. 
Workers taking jobs in the two sectors receive wages of w, and w2 on the 
average. An unemployed worker has a daily probability, p,  of locating a 
prospect, of which a fraction, a, comes from the rigid-wage sector while 
23. Many economists have misgivings  about this view. See, for example, Robert 
Solow's comments on this paper. Some of the misgivings  may arise from the tendency 
of proponents  of the search  theory to portray  it as an alternative  to demand-oriented 
theories  of unemployment. 
24. It would be more accurate  to discuss  the theory of unemployment  as one aspect 
of the complete  theory of the allocation  of individual  time that underlies  the net labor 
supply schedule in the diagram. Though individual workers supply unemployment, 
employers  do not demand unemployment.  Rather, the market  clears when employers 
demand  exactly  the supply  of labor net of the supply  of unemployment. Robert E. Hall  325 
1 -  a  comes from the competitive  sector. Both p and a are determined 
endogenously  in the model. In slack markets,  all jobs are hard to find 
(p is low) and  jobs in the rigid-wage  sector are particularly  hard  to find 
(a is low as well). 
Table  2 presents  the unemployment  rates  consistent  with  various  relative 
wages  for a hypothetical  group  in the labor force. These should  be con- 
sidered  as alternative  points  on the unemployment-competitive-wage  rela- 
tion in the diagram.  When the typical  job prospect  in the competitive 
sector pays only $4.00 per hour, against $5.00 in the other sector, the 
supply  of unemployment  is high-I 1.3 percent  of the labor  force.  The re- 
turn to holding  out for a good job is so high that many workers  do so, 
even  though  the cost is an extended  spell  of  joblessness.  In spite  of the high 
unemployment  rate, competitive  employers  are not swamped  with appli- 
cants  ready  to take  jobs below  the prevailing  wage.  The average  wage  paid 
to a worker  taking  a job in the competitive  sector  is $4.14,  well above  the 
average  prospect.  Competitive  employers  would  suffer  if they tried  to de- 
press the wage further,  because  even fewer of their offers  would be ac- 
cepted.  In other  respects,  the labor  market  shows  the usual  signs of slack 
conditions-prospects  are  difficult  to locate,  arriving  on the average  about 
once every  eight  weeks.  Only  about one in ten of the prospects  located  by 
an individual  comes from the rigid, high-wage  sector.  Two-thirds  of the 
unemployed  wind up in the competitive  sector.  At the other end of the 
supply schedule,  where  the two sectors  offer identical  wages,  the unem- 
ployment  rate  is only 1.6 percent.  Prospects  arrive  much  more  frequently, 
close to 1.5 per week.  Because  the rigid-wage  sector  is no longer  a magnet 
for the unemployed,  the mix of prospects  available  to an individual  is the 
same  as the mix of jobs being  filled.  At all points on the supply  schedule, 
the unemployed  are  making  the best of the situation,  given  the opportuni- 
ties available  in the two sectors.  None of the wage-unemployment  com- 
binations  depends on imperfect  knowledge  of actual conditions  in the 
labor market  on the part of the unemployed.  If the differential  between 
the wages of the two sectors  persists,  the supply of unemployment  will 
persist  as well. 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
In terms  of the empirical  results  on relative  wages  presented  in table 1, 
for wage differentials  to widen  in contractions  and narrow  in expansions, 326  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
Table 2.  Measures  of Labor-Market  Conditions  for Alternative  Levels 
of the Competitive  Wage 
Mean of 
prospective  Prospective  jobs 
wage  distri-  Average  wage 
bution  in  Unem-  Fraction  in  Weekly 
competitive Competitive,  Rigid,  ployment  rigid  frequency 
sector,  Il  W1  W2  rate, u  sector,  ca  of a 
(dollars)  (dollars)  (dollars)  (percent)  (percentt)  prospect,  p 
4.00  4.14  5.00  11.3  9.8  0.136 
4.20  4.34  5.00  8.8  9.8  0.179 
4.40  4.54  5.00  6.5  9.8  0.249 
4.60  4.74  5.00  4.3  9.8  0.385 
4.80  4.94  4.97  2.0  11.0  0.857 
5.00  5.14  5.14  1.6  34.0  1.450 
Source: Derived by author. For explanation, see text and appendix. 
the high-,B  industries  must also be high-a  industries.  Table 1 suggests  that 
this is the case, but the evidence  is not conclusive.  The pattern  of differen- 
tials facing  a particular  worker  is somewhat  different  from  the pattern  of 
the  as, because  the  aS  index  the variation  in occupational  mix across  indus- 
tries  as well as pure industry  differentials.  Table 3 attempts  to adjust  the 
gross  differentials  of table 1, shown  in column  (1), for the effects  of varia- 
tions  in quality  across  industries.  The  quality  index  in column  (2) of table  3 
was  derived  by estimating  relative  occupational  earnings  from 1970  census 
data  and then weighting  these  by the composition  of employment  in each 
industry.  The net industry  differentials  in column (3) suggest  that part, 
but by no means  all, of the gross  industry  differentials  are attributable  to 
variations  in occupational  mix. The high pay of workers  in the federal 
government  and regulated  industries  is largely  the result of policies of 
paying  more than the going wage for each occupation  and to a smaller 
extent  the result of hiring  a disproportionate  share of workers  in high- 
paying occupations.  By contrast,  high wages among unregulated  busi- 
nesses-mining, construction,  and wholesale  trade-reflect quality  differ- 
entials  to a greater  extent.  The only conspicuous  failure  of the positive 
association  of a  and fi is in the medical-educational  sector.  This reflects 
the low pay of nurses,  technicians,  and private-school  teachers  relative  to 
their  counterparts  in other sectors. The basic difficulty  of this kind of 
quality  adjustment  is its inability  to deal with "equalizing  differences" 
across  industries:  presumably  the  medical-educational  sector  is able  to hold Robert E. Hall  327 
Table 3.  Wage Differentials  before and after Adjustment 
for Occupational  Mix, by Major Industry,  1969 
Percent 
Gross  Quality  Net or pure 
differential  differential  differential 
Industry  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Nonentreprenieurial 
Federal  government  35  5  30 
Medicine  and education  -26  -1  -25 
Transportation  31  2  29 
Communication  12  2  10 
Utilities  24  8  16 
State and local government  5  5  0 
Enitrepreneurial 
Mining  22  19  3 
Nondurables  manufacturing  -5  -9  4 
Durables  manufacturing  12  4  8 
Construction  21  13  8 
Retail trade  -30  -14  -16 
Wholesale  trade  21  14  7 
Finance, insurance,  and real estate  6  5  1 
Services  -19  -4  -15 
Sources: Occupational wage differentials  are regression  estimates  from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Census  of Poptulation,  1970: Occupation  by Industry,  Final Report PC(2)-7C (1972), table 4; industiy quality 
is computed from industry occupational composition in ibid., table 1. Column (1) is from table 1 above, 
first column. 
its labor force in spite of its extremely  low wage because of the non- 
pecuniary  returns  to working  in the sector. 
With some reservations  about the success  of the quality  adjustments,  I 
have aggregated  the fourteen sectors of table 1 into two sectors-the 
entrepreneurial,  or competitive,  sector, and the nonentrepreneurial,  or 
rigid-wage,  sector-to  get the following  two-sector  relation: 
(19)  W2-  =  0.089 +  0.057 (log u -  log ui). 
For the various  unemployment  rates  in table  4, the percent  wage  differen- 
tial between  the two sectors  implied  by this estimated  relation  appears  in 
column  (1). In extremely  tight  markets  (comparable  to 1969),  the differen- 
tial is 8.9 percent.  At the postwar  average  (fixed-weight  unemployment 
index at 4.5 percent),  the differential  is 12.3 percent,  and in very slack 
markets  (comparable  to 1975),  the differential  rises  to 15.2  percent.  None 
of these  differentials  is large,  and the cyclical  response  is not sharp.  How- 
ever,  the supply  of unemployment  is sufficiently  sensitive  to the differential, 328  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
Table 4.  Wage Differential  at Alternative  Unemployment  Rates, 
and Unemployment  Rates Predicted by the Search Theory 
Percent 
Estimated  relationb  Adjusted  relationc 
Differential  Differential 
between  between 
entrepreneurial  entreprenieurial 
and non-  Predicted  anid  non-  Predicted 
enitrepreneurial unemployment enitrepreneurial  unemployment 
Uniemployment  sectors  rate  sectors  rate 
ratea  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
2.5  8.9  6.3  2.2  2.7 
3.5  10.8  7.4  4.1  3.7 
4.5  12.3  8.3  5.6  4.5 
5.5  13.4  8.9  6.7  5.1 
6.5  14.3  9.5  7.6  5.6 
7.5  15.2  10.0  8.5  6.1 
Sources: The estimated relation is derived  from text equation (19). For the adjusted relation, the constant 
in equation (19) was reduced so that the predicted wage differential  at 4.5 percent unemployment gave a 4.5 
percent prediction from the unemployment-supply  model. 
a.  Fixed-weight unemployment rate. 
b.  W2 -  WI  =  0.089 +  0.057 (log u -  log ui), where the symbols are as defined for text equation (19). 
C.  W2 -  WI =  0.022 +  0.057 (log u -  log ui),  which is the equation in note b adjusted as described  above. 
according  to the model, that these differentials  are too  large to be con- 
sistent  with  the unemployment  rates  in the table.  Column  (2) gives  the un- 
employment  rates  predicted  by the model; all are about  3 to 4 percentage 
points too high. Probably  the main source  of disagreement  is the inade- 
quate  adjustment  for quality  variations  across  industries,  though  many  of 
the unrealistic  simplifications  of the model may also contribute  to it. It is 
reasonable  to suppose  that the quality  differentials  are stable  from  year  to 
year,  so that the cyclical  movements  of the differential  are  measured  more 
accurately  than  is the  level.  As a rough  adjustment  for  the  error  in the  level, 
I have reduced  the constant  in the two-sector  equation  far enough  so that 
the predicted  wage differential  at 4.5 percent  unemployment  generates  a 
prediction  of 4.5 percent  from the unemployment-supply  model. The ad- 
justed wage differential  for the various unemployment  rates appears  in 
column  (3) of table  4, and the predictions  of the supply  model  in column 
(4). The predicted  unemployment  is slightly  high at low unemployment 
rates  and somewhat  low at high rates. Over  the range  of unemployment 
rates,  the response  of the predicted  rate is slightly  more than two-thirds 
of the actual change in unemployment.  The evidence  suggests  that the Robert E. Hall  329 
observed  relation  between  the wage  differential  and  the unemployment  rate 
is roughly  similar  to the relation  predicted  by the model  of unemployment 
supply.  There  is a quantitative  justification  for  the elasticity  of the  net  labor 
supply  schedule  in the diagram  with respect  to the competitive  wage. 
The facts about relative  wages and the unemployment  rate seem con- 
sistent  with the basic  view expressed  in this paper:  There  is a sector  with 
rigid wages,  employing  an important  minority  of the labor force. When 
demand  falls, the competitive  wage does not fall enough  to provide  em- 
ployment  for the entire  labor force. Rather,  part of the labor force  joins 
the queues  for good  jobs in the rigid-wage  sector  rather  than  accept  lower- 
paying  work  in the competitive  sector.  When  demand  is strong,  the com- 
petitive  sector  is able to bid labor away  from  the other  sector.  This result 
is compatible  with supply  behavior  because  the increase  in labor demand 
also closes the gap between  the two wages and reduces  the incentive  to 
wait for a job in the rigid-wage  sector. 
Aggregate Economic Policy with a Predetermined  Wage in the 
Nonentrepreneurial  Sector 
The unemployment  supply  equation  is 
(20)  W2-Wl-bo  +  31u3 
with 3, = 0.057. If w2 is considered  a predetermined  variable  in the econ- 
omy, then this equation  plays  the same  role as the wage-adjustment  equa- 
tion in the simple  two-equation  model of the introduction.  The effective- 
demand  equation  can be written  in terms  of the weighted  average  of the 
two wages: 
(21)  u =  I0 -  41  -(1-M  0)wl  -  Ow2]; 
0 is 0.34, the fraction  of the labor  force  receiving  the predetermined  wage. 
The reduced  form of the system  is 
(22)  ut  =  -  -0)  & -  -W2t) 
1  +i,t'1(1 -)3 
41  o-P1(l-  a)  30  11(Mt  t-W2t)  (23)  Wlt  =  W2t-  b0-1  I  +  -1(-0)  a  ) 
Each  value of mnt  corresponds  to a different  point on the wage-unemploy- 
ment tradeoff.  The slope of the tradeoff  between  wit and ut is just Al,  so 330  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1975 
the slope  between wt (the  weighted average of  wit  and  W2t)  and  ut is 
(1 -  0) 61. If 0 = 0.34 and  1  =  0.057, as suggested earlier, then the slope 
is 0.8 percentage  point of wage change  for each percentage  point of un- 
employment.  Monetary  authorities  face  a hard  decision  because  the trade- 
off is so flat: expansion  sharply  reduces  unemployment  today, but at the 
cost of future  inflation  after  W2t  begins  to respond.  Contraction  pulls the 
wage  down  disappointingly  little  considering  the increased  unemployment 
it brings  about.  In this  model,  rigidity  of 34 percent  of the  wages  is sufficient 
to explain  the sluggish  behavior  of all wages,  because  the optimizing  job 
search  of the unemployed  forces  competitive  employers  to moderate  wage 
adjustments.  The pessimistic  conclusions  of modern  Keynesians  are given 
a more  solid theoretical  foundation  by this view. 
If policy could somehow  influence  the level of the nonentrepreneurial 
wage, W2t,  the conclusion  would be less pessimistic.  The reduced-form 
equation  for  the  unemployment  rate  shows  that  a reduction  of 1 percentage 
point in w2 offers  exactly  the same  stimulus  as an increase  of 1 percentage 
point in the money  supply:  each  reduces  the unemployment  rate  by about 
0.25  percentage point,  assuming VI,  =  5.5.  Moreover,  the  expansion  is 
accompanied  by a fall in wages and thus in prices.  Instead of facing a 
tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment,  authorities  who could re- 
duce w2  could achieve  an unambiguous  improvement  in both dimensions 
at the same  time.  The effect  of a change  in w2 on the average  wage  level is 
(24)  dw =  (1  -0)  -  +  +) +0 
=  0.83. 
In contrast,  the effect  of a change  in the  money  supply  on the average  wage 
level  is 
(25)  OW=  (1  0)  Orm  1 +ii(1  -6)  a, 
=  0.17. 
A reduction  of 1 percentage  point in w2  yields almost  five times as much 
deflation  as a like  reduction  in the money  supply.  But  the two policies  have 
opposite effects on real output. Lowering  w2 stimulates  real output, so 
wages fall by more than the decline  in nominal output. Contractionary 
monetary  policy, on the other hand, reduces  real output and depresses 
wages  by less than the fall in nominal  output. Robert E. Hall  331 
Concluding  Remarks 
The rigidity  of wages  in the face of a predetermined  money  supply  and 
fiscal  policy  is the source  of the persistence  of unemployment.  Disequilib- 
rium  and  imperfect  information  are  only a small  part  of the story.  It seems 
to be a fact that wages  are  rigid  in one sector  of the labor  market,  though 
debate  about the importance  of competing  explanations  for this rigidity 
will  doubtless  continue.  In addition  to documenting  the  location  and  extent 
of the rigidity,  this paper  has contributed  an explanation  of the spillover 
of rigidity  to the residual  competitive  sector of the market.  Anti-infla- 
tionary  policies  are  largely  thwarted  by their  lack  of effect  on the rigid  wage 
or the flexible  wage, so they depress  real output instead of moderating 
inflation.  If the government  could  manipulate  the rigid  wage  directly,  real 
output could be expanded  at the same time that inflation  was brought 
under  control.  Alternatively,  if currently  rigid  wages  could be made  more 
responsive  to conditions  in the labor  market,  monetary  policy  would  have 
a larger  anti-inflationary  effect  and a smaller  contractionary  effect  on real 
output.  The scope  for federal  action  in either  direction  is narrow.  Strength- 
ening  the provisions  for linking  federal  to private  wages  and deregulation 
in the transportation  and utilities sectors offer some hope. In general, 
however,  the diagnosis  of this paper offers  relatively  poor prospects  for 
movement  toward  an economy  in which  the wage-price  mechanism  is free 
to do its job in protecting  real output from severe  contractions.  Federal 
policymakers  can probably  look forward  to a continuation  of their  power 
to affect  real output  and of their inability  to have much effect  on wages 
and  prices. 
APPENDIX 
The Supply  of Unemployment 
Under  Variable  Wage  Differentials 
THIS  APPENDIX  develops  a search  model  that  takes  explicit  account  of the 
importance  of sectoral  wage  differentials  on the  value  of time  spent  looking 332  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
for work.  The fundamental  precept  of any search  model  is that the unem- 
ployed are waiting  for  jobs to become  available  and that this behavior  is 
rational  from  the point of view of the individual  worker.  The time  may  be 
spent  in active  search,  but more often the unemployed  wait passively  for 
information  to reach  them  through  well-established  channels.25  It is some- 
times  best  to remain  unemployed  even  after  locating  a  job prospect  because 
a better  prospect  may  become  available  later.  Besides,  as Martin  Feldstein 
has pointed  out, many  workers  who are unemployed  as a result  of layoffs 
have good chances  of returning  to their  original  jobs.26 
Descriptions  of search models have emphasized  the diversity  of job 
prospects  that may be available  to an unemployed  worker.  Virtually  all 
models  view the unemployed  as sampling  from a probability  distribution 
of prospective  wages.  Under  certain  conditions,  the optimal  search  rule  is 
to establish  a reservation  wage,  w*,  and  to accept  the first  job paying  more 
than wK.27  A representative  model appears  in "The  Process  of Inflation," 
appendix  C. The  first  step  here  is to specify  a probabilistic  characterization 
of the prospects  available  in a labor  market  with two kinds  of employers. 
Suppose  workers  face  a normal  distribution  of wage  prospects  in the com- 
petitive  sector  with mean  Al  and standard  deviation  a-,,  and similarly  face 
a normal  distribution  in the high-wage  sector  with  parameters  g2 and  LT2.28 
Prospects  arrive  randomly  at a weekly  rate,  p, and the probability  that a 
given prospect  comes from the high-wage  sector is a.  Both p and a  are 
endogenous  in the model.  The overall  distribution  of prospects  is not nor- 
mal, but a "mixture"  of two normals. 
The unemployed  worker  establishes  a reservation  wage,  w*, and accepts 
the first  job in either  sector  that pays at least that much.  Workers  taking 
25. For a comprehensive  review of evidence on this point, see Robert J. Gordon, 
"The Welfare Cost of Higher Unemployment,"  BPEA, 1:1973, app. C, pp. 188-95. 
Gordon concludes  that the typical  unemployed  worker  spends 19 percent  of his normal 
working time in job-seeking activities. Less than half of this time is spent in active 
search;  the rest is spent reading  want ads and in other passive  activities. 
26. "Temporary  Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment"  (Harvard  Institute of 
Economic  Research,  July 1975; processed). 
27. See Meir G. Kohn and Steven  Shavell,  "The  Theory  of Search,"  Journal  of Eco- 
nomic  Theory,  vol. 9 (October 1974),  pp. 93-123. Michael Rothschild  has investigated 
cases  in which  optimal  search  rules  are more  complicated,  but concludes  that qualitative 
behavior  is largely  the same under  them; see "Searching  for the Lowest Price When  the 
Distribution  of Prices  Is Unknown,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 82 (July-August 
1974),  pp. 689-711. 
28. The normal distribution  seems a reasonable approximation.  It is realistic in 
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jobs in the two sectors receive wages of w, and w2  on the average (these are 
the  conditional  expectations  of  the  two  distributions and  were called 
"effective wages" in  "The Process  of  Inflation"). The  measured wage 
differential  is w2 -w,  and is always less than the difference in the means 
of  the two  distributions (see table 2).  The average wage received by a 
newly employed worker is 
w  (  0)WI+w  OW2, 
where 0 is the fraction of jobs in the rigid-wage sector. A search strategy is 
optimal when its expected payoff equals the reservation wage.29  Suppose 
unemployment compensation pays workers a fraction, z,  of their usual 
wage during  periods of search; this "replacement  ratio" is apparently  about 
60 percent for eligible workers and about half the unemployed are eligible, 
so I will take z to be 30 percent. Then the reservation wage is 
w*-  [1-(1-z)  u] w, 
where u is the unemployment rate. 
The probability that a job prospect from the competitive sector will be 
accepted, ql, is 
1- _  tM  (W*  -  ) 
where cf is the cumulative normal distribution, gu is the mean of the wage 
distribution for the noncontractual sector, and a-1  is the standard deviation 
for that sector; for the competitive sector this probability is 
q2  =  1  t  (w  Me) 
where g2 and  o-2 are the wage mean and standard deviation for the con- 
tractual sector. The fraction of job prospects from the high-wage sector is 




The weekly probability that an unemployed worker will take a job, h, is 
the product of the probability that a prospect will become available and 
the probability that it will be accepted: 
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h =  p  [(1 -a)ql+  aq2]. 
The unemployment  rate  is 
u  h 
h+  (j; 
where  4 is the weekly  probability  of becoming  unemployed. 
To complete  the supply model, it is necessary  to specify  the relation 
between  the competitive  wage and the frequency  of prospects,  as deter- 
mined  by the recruiting  procedures  of competitive  employers.  I will  assume 
that employers  make wage offers  to qualified  workers  by drawing  from a 
normal  distribution  with mean ,  and standard  deviation  a-1.  Presumably, 
the randomness  of wage  offers  derives  from  underlying  uncertainty  about 
the quality  of workers,  but the model will not attempt  to deal with that 
explicitly.  Firms  choose gu  with full knowledge  of workers'  search  rules. 
If Al  is far  below  the reservation  wage  of workers,  a large  number  of offers 
will  have  to be made  before  one is accepted.  If it is too high,  firms  will pay 
needlessly  high  wages.  The  expected  cost of hiring  and  paying  one worker  is 
E(c) =co  +  40?Aw  I  w*). 
Here, q  =  - -((w*  -  i)/li)  is the probability that a given offer will be 
accepted;  its inverse  is the expected  number  of offers  required  to recruit 
one worker.  The coefficient  co  is the dollar  cost of one offer;  E(w  I  w ?  w*) 
is the expected  hourly  wage,  taking  account  of the unwillingness  of anyone 
to work  below the reservation  wage,  w*; and 40/4 is the total number  of 
hours  the worker  is expected  to remain  with the firm,  working  40 hours 
per week.  If a-  is $0.10 and co  is $15.00,  then cost is minimized  when  ,  is 
set a little  less than one standard  deviation  below  the reservation  wage,  in 
which  case the expected  number  of offers  to fill one position  is five and q 
is 0.2. 
The model contains five parameters:  the turnover  rate, 4,  taken as 
0.005;  the two standard  deviations  of wage  prospects,  a-1  and  O2, both  taken 
as $0.10; the fraction  of jobs in the rigid-wage  sector,  0, taken as 0.34; 
and the mean of prospects  in the rigid-wage  sector,  A2,  taken as $5.00. 
It contains  eleven endogenous  variables,  pi, w*, ql, q2,  h, p, a,  u, w1, w2, 
and w, related  by ten equations.  Altogether,  it determines  a relationship 
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interpreted  as the supply  schedule  of unemployment.  The relationship  can 
be calculated  in the following  way: Select  an arbitrary  gj. From the re- 
quirement  that the probability  of acceptance  in the competitive  sector  is 
0.2, compute  w* (the relation  is w"  =  g, +  0.8ofi).  Compute  w, and w2  as 
the conditional  expectations  given this reservation  wage, and from them 
the expected  wage, w. Finally,  compute  the unemployment  rate from the 
equation  for the optimal  reservation  wage,  as follows: 
1 -w*/w 
1-z 
The other  equations  can be solved  for the remaining  variables. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Christopher  Sims: Hall presents  a neatly  worked-out  mechanism  whereby 
the  wage  level,  wage  dispersion,  and  unemployment  are  related,  so that  small 
changes  in the level of average  nominal  wages  can be associated  with  large 
changes  in unemployment.  The mechanism  also allows  persistence  of un- 
employment  to be explained  by ad hoc rigidities  in a few key sectors,  in- 
stead  of the naive  Keynesian  assumption  of an economy-wide  rigid  wage. 
Hall's  theory,  or others  in this spirit,  may  prove  to be important  links  in 
the  development  of nonclassical  macro  models  capable  of meeting  the  chal- 
lenge of the "new classical"  macro models (devised  by Lucas, Sargent, 
and Wallace  among others)  by generating  some Keynesian  conclusions 
without  reliance  on ad hoc treatment  of expectations  or on arbitrary  price 
and wage  rigidities. 
Even  where  I disagree  with  Hall's  argument,  I found  the paper  a stimu- 
lating  treatment  of important  issues. 
Besides  presenting  his own model, Hall devotes  considerable  space to 
attacks,  based  on "empirical  results,"  on both the new classical  models  of 
the Phillips  curve and Keynes'  view that flexible  wages would not cure 
depressions.  Neither  of these  attacks  is convincing. 
Hall claims  that the new classical  theories  of the Phillips  curve  have no 
explanation  for persistence  in deviations  of unemployment  from  its mean; 
on this  basis  he claims  to decompose  the variance  of unemployment  into a 
part  "explained"  and a part "unexplained"  by the new classical  theories. 
The  latter  turns  out large  in his calculations. 
Hall's  calculations  make  these  theories  appear  unwarrantedly  feeble,  for 
two  reasons.  First,  this decomposition  of variance  is inherently  fuzzy,  like 
any decomposition  of variance  into parts "explained"  by intercorrelated 
explanatory  variables.  All variance  in unemployment  in these  models  arises 
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from shifts  in the natural  rate  (E),  shifts  in aggregate  demand  (q), and the 
money supply  (m). Hall arbitrarily  resolves  part of the ambiguity  by at- 
tributing  to shifts in the natural  rate all variance  in the money supply 
and aggregate  demand  that is correlated  with shifts in the natural  rate. 
One could instead attribute  to m and q all variance  due to  E that is 
correlated  with  the  unpredictable  parts  of m +  q.  This  choice  would  lead  to 
attributing  all of the unpredictable  variance  in unemployment  to infla- 
tionary  surprises,  raising  Hall's 1.7 percent  bound  to 6.7 percent. 
The new classical  theories  Hall examines  do contain  an explanation  of 
persistence  in unemployment:  delay  in the flow of information.  The delay 
is not generated  endogenously  by these  theories,  and its length  is a matter 
of judgment.  Informal  discussions  of how such  a delay  might  arise  suggest 
that a delay of one year, rather  than Hall's three months,  would not be 
implausible.'  Using Hall's  own estimated  second-order  autoregression,  the 
implied  proportion  of variance  possibly  not due  to e rises,  under  a one-year 
information  delay,  to 67 percent.  Finally,  as a kind of footnote,  Hall's  use 
of quarterly  average  data in place of the point data appropriate  to the 
theory  is an additional,  possibly  serious,  source  of bias toward  a finding 
that the new classical  models  are feeble. 
The other  major  empirical  result  of the paper  is a claim  that the MPS 
model constitutes  an empirical  refutation  of Keynes' recommendation 
against  wage  flexibility  as a cure  for depression.  The evidence  adduced  is a 
simulation  in the MPS model of the effects  of a change  in money  supply, 
not the wage.  But cyclically  flexible  wages  would  move downward  at some 
finite  rate in the presence  of excess  supply.  A major  leg of Keynes'  argu- 
ment against  flexible  wages  was his concern  for the adverse  impact  of ex- 
pected  deflation  during  periods  of slack  demand. 
Even  the MPS  model,  fitted  to a period  when  wages  have  not been  flex- 
ible, would  surely  show a response  to a drop in wages  over one year  at a 
1 percent  annual  rate very different  from that to a 1 percent  increase  in 
money supply,  were  its expectational  equations  allowed  to work. And if 
there  is anything  we should  have  learned  from  Lucas,  Sargent,  and  Wallace, 
it is that  if the wage  did become  cyclically  flexible,  the expectational  equa- 
tions of the MPS model  would  surely  change  substantially. 
Thus,  Hall's  conclusion  that  modern  empirical  evidence  shows  Keynes  to 
have been wrong  on this score  cannot  be taken  seriously. 
1. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Some International  Evidence on  Output-Inflation 
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Some important  empirical  issues deserving  further  study are raised  by 
Hall's analysis.  Three  alternative,  not completely  incompatible,  types of 
theories  about  the determinants  of unemployment  float around  here.  One, 
the "old structuralism,"  asserts  that a great  deal of variance  in unemploy- 
ment is not related  to inflation,  but instead  to institutional  factors  and 
labor-force  composition.  Another,  the new classical  sort of theory,  asserts 
that  part  of unemployment  is related  to inflation,  but that  that  part  should 
be serially  uncorrelated  over  periods  longer  than  the information  delay.  A 
third,  of which  Hall's  is an example,  also relates  unemployment  to inflation 
in part but asserts  that that part is perhaps  serially  correlated  over long 
spans  of time. 
It is my impression  that careful  time-series  studies do not show that 
nominal wages explain a large fraction of variance  in unemployment, 
whether  or not that  fraction  of variance  is serially  uncorrelated.  Further,  a 
sharper  test of Hall's  theory  versus  the new  classical  theory  would  examine 
the serial  correlation  properties  of inflation-related  unemployment,  not of 
all unemployment,  as in this  paper.  A careful  study  of just what  time-series 
data do show (which may already  exist in recent unpublished  work by 
Sargent)  would  be worthwhile. 
One policy conclusion  would follow directly  from resolution  of these 
issues.  If price-related  unemployment  does show strong  serial  correlation, 
and  large  variance,  every  sustained  shift  in the unemployment  rate  need  not 
be feared  as a shift  in the natural  rate.  Hence,  there  would  be no need  to be 
concerned  that aggregate-demand  policy to counter  such sustained  shifts 
would  generate  accelerating  inflation. 
But  Hall's  micro  theory  is not yet in shape  to provide  policy  implications. 
The  closest  he comes  to a theory  of how the wage  is set  in rigid-wage  sectors 
is to label  them  "nonentrepreneurial,"  which  might  suggest  that  they  could 
be directly  controlled  by policy without  ill effects.  But those sectors  also 
seem  to be ones with  cyclically  insensitive  demand,  suggesting  that cyclical 
movements  in wage dispersion  might be serving  an important  allocative 
function. 
Also, the nonentrepreneurial  sectors will surely eventually respond  to 
sustained  inflation.  If those sectors  show no long-run  money  illusion,  the 
degree  of stickiness  in their  wage  payments  plays  much  the same  role  as the 
inflation  delay  in the new classical  models.  Determining  how long it takes 
nonentrepreneurial  wages  to adjust  would  be critical  for analysis  of aggre- 
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Robert  Solow:  Robert  Hall's paper  is about one of the fundamental  pre- 
questions  of macroeconomics:  When  there is perceptible  unemployment, 
why  don't  unemployed  workers  cut their  wages  to try  to displace  employed 
workers  who are still holding  jobs identical  to the ones the unemployed 
workers  have  just lost? Similarly,  why  don't  employers  aggressively  solicit 
offers  like that?  Why don't they recruit  wage  cutters  all the time? 
Hall deemphasizes  two possible  answers  to that question:  First,  he does 
not attribute  it to trade-union  power.  Organized  workers  are too small  a 
part  of the labor  force.  And if they  had so much  power  to hold up wages, 
why should  they refrain  from  demanding  wage  increases  when  labor  mar- 
kets are tight for years  on end?  Second,  he dismisses  the explanation  that 
wage  rigidity  arises  because  workers  or employers  have inadequate  infor- 
mation about the labor market.  On this view, unemployed  people think 
they are  just victims  of casual  fluctuations  that will be reversed  soon. He 
finds  this implausible  because  it requires  an invincible  ignorance  in the face 
of persistent  unemployment.  I thought  the paper  was very good on this 
point, but that is probably  because  I never  found such theories  remotely 
plausible  in the first  place. 
Hall's own explanation  is that search  will turn up many  job offers.  As 
long as there  is some  dispersion  in job offers,  an unemployed  worker  does 
not necessarily  collar  an employer  and  say, "Take  me instead  of him,  I will 
work  for 10  percent  less."  He knows  that if he sits back  and waits,  a more 
favorable  job offer  will come along. 
What  maintains  the dispersion  in  job offers?  In Hall's  view  it is the non- 
entrepreneurial  sector-consisting of government,  nonprofit  institutions, 
and regulated  industries-which  is not subject  to the usual  profit-and-loss 
pressures,  and still offers  jobs at high wages  in the face of unemployment. 
I don't  find  this account  very  plausible  and  I confess  that  this feeling  ex- 
tends  to the search  theory  altogether.  Hall wants  me to believe  that an un- 
employed  auto  worker  or steel  worker  or construction  worker  refrains  from 
cutting  the wage,  because  he or she correctly  expects  a better-paying  job as 
a school  teacher  or a hospital  administrator  or on the staff  of the Federal 
Reserve. 
Of course,  Hall does not expect  that to happen  literally.  But it needs  to 
be shown  not only that  the nonentrepreneurial  sector  offers  a mix of occu- 
pational  slots that is roughly  comparable  with the occupations  and loca- 
tion of those  unemployed  from  the entrepreneurial  sector,  but also that  the 
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sistent unemployment is adequate to  make the want-ad search strategy 
sensible. In this connection, the very fact of persistent unemployment tells 
us that the number of such nonentrepreneurial-sector  jobs cannot be ade- 
quate to compensate the unemployed for waiting unless the wage differ- 
ential is very substantial. I cannot see this as a major part of the unemploy- 
ment story. Search theory claims that the unemployed are waiting and 
searching, and that this waiting and searching process is rational. More- 
over, Hall cites R. J. Gordon's finding that more than half of the search is 
passive, consisting of things like reading want ads. Does  anybody really 
believe that the unemployed voluntarily refrain from working in order to 
read want ads? I think their spouses could do that for them, or they could 
do it for themselves in the evenings or in their spare time. 
This description may apply to the unemployed stockbroker who reads 
the Sunday Times. But it does not seem to me a good description of manual 
workers.  It does not seem to me a description of the only labor market that 
we all know intimately-namely,  that for academic economists. Most of us 
search rather well while we are employed. According to R. J. Gordon, un- 
employed workers spend an average of four hours a week in active search, 
and that seems to me an inadequate explanation for avoiding employment. 
I am not at all satisfied that I have an alternative answer to this funda- 
mental question. I think it is a puzzle. I am half inclined to take the cow- 
ard's or the rascal's way out, and say that it may have to do with what we 
call noneconomic factors: it is a mistake to tie yourself into intellectual 
knots trying to make unemployment a rational occupation in a narrow 
economic sense. 
It might be rational in a much broader context. An unemployed worker 
may not try to get somebody else's job by cutting the wage, because one 
does not do that sort of thing. Surely, most of the people in the world re- 
frain from crime because of their upbringing, not  because of the Gary 
Becker  calculus. Perhaps people have strong feelings of equity about rela- 
tive wages in various  jobs that would be violated if they undercut  wages and 
thus disturbed the differentials. 
One gets more insight into this phenomenon from Arthur Okun's picture 
of the rent that exists in every job, as described in his article in this issue. 
Part of the rent is maintained by mutual tacit consent that prevents this 
kind of cutthroat wage cutting. Employers have morale and their reputa- 
tions as good employers to worry about, once the market gets tight. It is 
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ployer is largely unfettered in his wage policy. Employers believe, to a cer- 
tain extent, that they get what they pay for, and they may be right. 
I remind you of a similar puzzle on the employer's side of the market, 
more or less independent of the labor market. In depressed periods, with a 
lot of idle capacity and with the going price in commodity markets almost 
certainly well above marginal costs, why don't firms in reasonably com- 
petitive markets cut prices aggressively?  This should be a profitable strategy 
at a fixed wage, but it would be even more profitable if, by soliciting wage 
cuts, an employer could cut his price still more aggressively. Some argue 
that firms actually do cut prices: transaction prices fall below list prices in 
depressed periods. But this phenomenon cannot be very important; other- 
wise, why doesn't real output rise as equations predict it will when prices 
fall? But even if prices are a bit more flexible than the data imply, it is pre- 
sumably a lot harder for an employer to create a difference  between the list 
wage and the transaction wage. 
I still think that the observed pricing behavior is a puzzle. Over the years 
I would have expected to see more attempts to cut price in slack periods 
than have occurred.  Apparently, many firms perceive themselves as unable 
to expand sales by cutting price. Maybe they believe that price cuts will be 
met by other firms, as the old-fashioned view of kinked demand curves sug- 
gests. Often, in fact, they will be. Markets as a whole might absorb more 
output at a lower nominal price level, because of the Pigou effect and the 
Keynes effect, but you can hardly expect some poor retailer to make bets 
with his livelihood on that basis. 
Hall finds that the MPS model predicts a powerful effect on real output 
from lower prices and wages. A lot of the big models come close to deter- 
mining nominal GNP,  so lower prices will imply a proportionally higher 
real GNP.  Hall says the MPS model would do even better than that. A 
1 percent reduction in all wages and prices, like a 1 percent increase in the 
money supply, will raise real output by  1'/2  percent in eight quarters. So 
a 10 percent reduction in nominal wages and prices would add 15 percent 
to  GNP  and reduce unemployment from 8 1/2  percent to 4 percent. If I 
could bring myself to believe that, I think I would be for price control. 
Hall seems to proceed as if the sentence, "Lower wages imply higher out- 
put," is the same thing as the sentence, "Falling wages imply rising out- 
put." Christopher Sims has already laid out the reasons why that is not 
necessarily  true. More generally, there are very few dynamics in this paper. 
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with the same coefficient on both sides of the equation. The only inter- 
temporal  element in the wage adjustment  equation is carried  in the expected 
rate of change of wages, wi. 
I thought Hall convincingly demolished the view that unemployment is a 
disequilibrium  phenomenon in the sense of rational expectations. However, 
I was surprised at his statement that the quarterly unemployment rate is 
very well predicted by a two-quarter autoregression. He reports that that 
equation has a standard error of 0.3, which means a 90 percent confidence 
interval for predicting the unemployment rate one quarter ahead would 
have to be 1 full percentage point wide. That is not a very tight regression. 
Hall notes that high-wage industries have unresponsive wages. By and 
large, those same industries increase their share of employment in periods 
when unemployment rises. So, their wages may be insensitive because their 
output is insulated from economic fluctuations. 
Hall's argument seems to imply that unemployment would have been less 
persistent when the nonentrepreneurial  sector was smaller. That is a test- 
able hypothesis that would repay a bit more careful investigation, perhaps 
even some cross-country investigation. 
I started by noting that the failure of wages to be cut when there is unem- 
ployment poses a pre-question. But unemployment does change. And one 
question to ask of any theory of unemployment is what brings about those 
changes. If Hall's reply is that changes in the probability distribution of 
job offers facing unemployed workers does it, then maybe the theory is not 
so unconventional after all. Although Hall wants to emphasize the increase 
in the spread of that distribution, if that change is associated with a reduced 
frequency of offers, that is the aspect of the change that I would emphasize. 
A theory that explains changes in unemployment by changes in the charac- 
ter and availability of jobs is hardly unconventional; but it has the merit of 
pointing research in the direction of  studying the  determinants of  that 
distribution. 
R. A. Gordon:  My points of disagreement with Hall's paper are numerous, 
and I cannot mention them all. The following are some of the more im- 
portant ones. 
First, the paper is written in a historical and institutional vacuum. Hall's 
theoretical analysis, although expressed in completely general terms, ob- 
viously is framed with recent American experience in mind. Would he 
assert that the same relationships held for the period before World War II 
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the paper  almost completely  ignores  important  aspects  of the American 
labor market-notably, changes  in the age-sex  composition  of the labor 
force  and the evidence  regarding  labor immobility.  Hall treats  the labor 
supply  as completely  homogeneous.  On the demand  side, the only dis- 
aggregation  worth making  is apparently  between  "entrepreneurial"  and 
"nonentrepreneurial"  employers.  Modern  search  theory  converts  all unem- 
ployment  into "frictional"  unemployment,  which I presume  Hall would 
call the equilibrium  rate  of unemployment.  Search  theorists,  and also Hall 
in this  paper,  ignore  the heterogeneity  of the labor  force  along  a number  of 
dimensions,  as well  as the associated  lack  of mobility.  What  was  once  called 
"structural"  unemployment  has  no place  in their  models;  and  the relatively 
high  unemployment  rates  among  ethnic  minorities,  youth,  and women  are 
irrelevant,  with the possible  qualification  that low enough  wages  for these 
groups  presumably  would  reduce  their  unemployment  rates  to a satisfac- 
torily  low level, the same  as that of white  adult  males. 
Second,  this is a static model, used to draw  inferences  about a highly 
dynamic  world  in which  expectations,  based on the past and present,  are 
crucial  for future  behavior.  I have in mind not merely  price  expectations 
but, even  more  important,  expectations  as to the course  of economic  activ- 
ity. Would  any downward  adjustment  in wages  in 1974-75  have  prevented 
the past year's  rise in unemployment?  Wages  fell significantly  in 1931-33. 
Would  an even greater  decline  have prevented  the rise in unemployment 
that was actually  observed? 
Third,  the symbol  u* plays a crucial  role in the paper. So far as I can 
ascertain,  it is never  precisely  defined.  It is referred  to as the natural,  or 
equilibrium,  rate.  If it is the natural  rate  in the  Friedman-Phelps  sense,  then 
it is an equilibrium  rate in the very long term, where "long term"  pre- 
sumably  means  a decade  or probably  more. Yet the implications  of the 
analysis  presented  here  are  that u*  is an equilibrium  unemployment  rate  in 
the fairly  short  run,  and  that  it is continuously  shifting.  It would  be helpful 
if Hall would  be more  precise  about  what  he means  by  "equilibrium"  in the 
labor  market  and about  what  specific  assumptions  underlie  his concept  of 
equilibrium. 
Fourth,  Hall presents  a simple  two-equation  model, one for unemploy- 
ment  and  one for  wage  changes,  that,  in his words,  "captures  the  theoretical 
relationships  that are important  for the issues addressed  by this paper." 
For "the issues addressed  by this paper,"  this model is obviously  inade- 
quate. 
Fifth, the paper  is studded  with startling  generalizations  that the theo- 344  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
retical  arguments  and  scanty  empirical  evidence  cited  certainly  do not sup- 
port.  Thus "in times  of high unemployment,  a reduction  in money  wages 
would  restore  full  employment."  And "the  connection  between  unemploy- 
ment  and  wages  is the place  to look for an explanation  of persistent  unem- 
ployment." 
Sixth,  apparently,  trade  unions don't matter.  Is this true in the United 
Kingdom  and other  European  countries  as well as the United States?  In 
Hall's  world,  trade  unions  don't contribute  to upward  pressure  on wages 
because  in cyclical  downswings  wages  in sectors  dominated  by unions  (es- 
pecially  manufacturing)  show a greater  retardation  in wage  increases  than 
do nonunionized  sectors-especially  government.  The federal  government 
follows  rather  than  leads  in wage  negotiations.  Having  followed  the private 
sector  upward,  government,  for a variety  of reasons,  does not follow the 
private  sector  downward  in its wage  increases. 
Finally, Hall views the unemployed  as confronting  a probability  dis- 
tribution  of prospective  wage offers. A  single distribution  applying  to 
blacks  and whites,  males  and females,  adults  and teenagers,  and without 
reference  to education,  training,  innate  ability,  or geographical  location? 
A good deal  of the rest  of his paper  proceeds  explicitly  or by inference  as if 
the entire  labor force  consisted  of a homogeneous  body of workers.  And 
I cannot  take  very  seriously  the calculations  in the latter  part of the paper 
that  assume,  among  other  things,  that  workers  are  really  free  to select  from 
the wage  offers  in Hall's  array  of industries. 
Robert  Hall: Christopher  Sims  has raised  a fundamental  point in my criti- 
cism of the rational-expectations  model.  In my computation,  I net out the 
inflation  and  unemployment  surprises  that  come from  shifts  in the Phillips 
curve  so as to isolate  pure  movements  along  the curve.  He suggests  that  an 
unexpected  event,  like  the  runup  in oil prices,  shifts  the  Phillips  curve  at the 
same  time that it alters  aggregate  demand. 
I, however,  assume  that  shifts  in the Phillips  curve  are  uncorrelated  with 
shifts  in aggregate  demand  in order  to derive  my 1.7  percent  estimate.  If the 
Federal  Reserve  does something  unexpected  or oil prices  rise, why should 
these  events  shift  the Phillips  curve?  These  factors  will generate  movement 
along  the  curve,  not shift  it. On  this  assumption,  the fraction  of variation  in 
unemployment  associated  with such surprises  is small. 
The  second  point  that Sims  makes  concerns  the time  it takes  to discover 
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ple make  rational  decisions  based  on their  knowledge  about  the economy 
today.  But people  don't know what is happening  today. They only know 
what happened  up to a certain  time in the past. My argument  depends 
crucially  on the length  of that lag-that  it takes only about  three  months, 
perhaps  less-to  find out what is happening  in the economy.  The unem- 
ployed  know what  has happened  with respect  to the availability  of work 
and  the  level of wages,  and  how many  unemployed  are  competing  for  jobs, 
and  their  knowledge  is reasonably  up to date.  Very  few people  remain  un- 
employed  more than fifteen weeks. Most information  that unemployed 
people  collect  covers  their  period  of unemployment,  maybe  a little  longer. 
In that case, their  information  is up to date, the information  lag is short, 
and  my estimate  is correct. 
Sims'  third  point, which  also concerned  Robert Solow, involves  defla- 
tionary  expectations.  He argues,  as did Keynes,  that falling  wages  will not 
bring  about recovery  because  expectations  of future  deflation  will cause 
people  to reduce  consumption.  I originally  planned  to answer  this question 
by simulating  a wage  cut in the MPS  model  with  and without  the expecta- 
tional  mechanism.  However,  the structure  of the MPS  model  turns  out not 
to be suited  to this task; wage  cuts cannot  be studied  directly  because  so 
many  exogenous  variables  are  specified  in nominal  terms.  An examination 
of the expectations  equations  of the model  suggests  that  the damping  effect 
of expectations  is very  small.  My paper  certainly  does  not do justice  to the 
dynamic  issues.  It only claims  that the medium-  and long-run  impact  of a 
1 percent  reduction  in wages,  everything  else including  the money stock 
held constant,  raises  real output  by about 1 percent.  The process  operates 
fairly  rapidly  (and with some overshooting)  in the MPS model. Over a 
one-year  span,  there  seems  to be an important  wage  elasticity  of aggregate 
demand. 
Sims correctly  points out that this paper does not present  a theory  of 
wage  determination  because  it shows  that  a number  of sectors  are  not sub- 
ject to arbitrage.  For the same  reason  it does not project  inflation.  It only 
leaves the reader  with the pessimistic  thought that controlling  inflation 
through  a reduction  in output, rather  than wages, will be unbelievably 
expensive. 
With  respect to Robert  Solow's  major  comment,  it strikes  me as point- 
less  to argue  whether  the unemployed  behave  rationally.  I am certainly  not 
as ready  as he is to invoke  noneconomic  factors.  However,  I agree  that  one 
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for lower wages. I thought  my previous  Brookings  paper  (2:1974)  made 
progress  in showing  how the unemployed  depress  the competitive  wage 
even  though  they do not bid it down directly.  Wages  change  because  em- 
ployers  post  wages  for  job openings  in a way  that  responds  to conditions  in 
the  labor  market  (movements  of the scale  wage)  and  the actual  cost of labor 
varies  relative  to the scale wage, again  in response  to the unemployment 
rate (movements  of the effective  wage). One of the major  points of that 
paper  was  to show  that  the  kinds  of arguments  made  by Solow  do not make 
a convincing  case for wage rigidity.  In Solow's  view, wages  are held rigid 
by a "gentlemen's  agreement"  among  employers  and workers  not to raise 
or lower  wages  in response  to market  pressures.  My earlier  paper  argued 
that institutional  features  of the labor  market  that seem  to support  such a 
gentlemen's  agreement  in fact are undercut  by a variety of adjustment 
mechanisms  that make effective  wages flexible.  The new paper can be 
thought  of as asking  why  these  mechanisms  don't eliminate  persistent  un- 
employment.  Its answer  is that the economic  pressures  that Solow and 
other  economists  believe  to be present  in times of high unemployment- 
pressures  associated  with  the willingness  of the unemployed  to work  below 
the prevailing  wage-are not actually  present.  In contrast,  Solow invokes 
the gentlemen's  agreement  to explain  why the pressures  do not move the 
wage.  There  isn't  any direct  evidence  to help  us choose  between  the two. 
It isn't easy  to respond  to Aaron  Gordon's  criticisms,  because  he would 
have me write  a book on this subject  rather  than an over-long  paper.  In 
concentrating  on one aspect of the many puzzling  characteristics  of the 
labor market,  the paper does omit many other considerations:  applica- 
bility of the argument  to other times and places, implications  of the di- 
versity of labor supply, determinants  of structural  unemployment,  and 
other major issues. Readers of my earlier  contributions  to BPEA will 
know  that I am hardly  oblivious  to the importance  of these other  consid- 
erations.  Let me just say that this particular  paper  is concerned  with the 
behavior  of the cyclical component  of unemployment  in today's  American 
economy, hardly an unimportant  matter with today's unemployment 
rates,  and  I do not see how a full  treatment  of the other  issues  would  have  a 
major  impact  on the central  argument  of this paper. 
Gordon  asks  whether  I believe  that any downward  adjustment  in wages 
in 1974  would  have prevented  the current  recession.  My answer  is an un- 
ambiguous  yes. Here  I am only  seconding  the remark  of Keynes  quoted  on 
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that wage-price  reductions  would reduce  interest  rates  (the LM schedule 
is fairly steep) and that interest  rates are an important  determinant  of 
expenditure  (the IS curve  is fairly  flat). The behavior  of the MPS model 
accords  with this view. Professional  diagnoses  of the cause  of the current 
recession  lend further  support:  an exogenous  increase  in prices  not accom- 
modated  by an increase  in the money supply drove interest  rates to ex- 
treme  levels,  which  in turn  depressed  investment,  building,  and purchases 
of consumer  durables.  Any  economist  who  accepts  this  view  of the  recession 
must  also believe  that an exogenous  downward  movement  in prices  would 
have a strong  stimulative  effect. 
Gordon  inquires  about  the definition  of the symbol  u*.  In the model  in 
the introductory  section, u* is nothing more than the constant in the 
Phillips  curve.  As he suggests,  it is the "natural  rate"  in the sense  of Fried- 
man  and  Phelps.  I avoid  calling  u*  the "equilibrium"  rate  except  within  the 
theories  in which  equilibrium  is well defined.  These  are the classic  theory, 
where  equilibrium  simply  means  clearing  of the market,  and the theory  of 
rational  expectations,  where  equilibrium  means  that no economic  agents 
are  acting  on the basis  of incorrect  information.  In the second  case,  I show 
that the theory  implies  that, according  to rational  expectations,  virtually 
all movements  in the unemployment  rate are movements  in the equilib- 
rium  rate,  which  is obviously  not a very  interesting  concept  of equilibrium. 
The theory  advocated  by the paper  does not rest on a notion of equilib- 
rium  toward  which  the economy  moves  either  quickly  or slowly. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  faulted  Hall's  job-search  model.  William  Nordhaus 
doubted  that unemployed  workers  had firm  ideas about  the dispersion  of 
wages;  he found quite fanciful  the notion that their  labor-force  response 
was primarily  a response  to perceived  widening  and narrowing  of wage 
dispersion  over the cycle. Hall replied  that they only need to judge their 
chances  of doing  better  than  their  current  job prospects  by waiting  a little 
longer,  not that  they  had  to make  impossible  calculations.  Charles  Schultze 
thought  it irrational  of workers  to hold out for higher  wages  as they do in 
Hall's  model,  since  their  income  advantage  is only  temporary,  disappearing 
when  the wage  differentials  collapse  in tighter  labor  markets.  But the per- 
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reason,  according  to Hall, for workers  to try for a high wage.  His simula- 
tions suggested  that only a few years  of wage differentials  could explain 
search  behavior  on his lines. John Shoven  saw Hall's search  model as a 
possible  explanation  of longer  unemployment  duration  during  weak  labor 
markets,  but  as no help  in explaining  the  more  frequent  spells  of unemploy- 
ment  experienced  during  such  times.  Robert  J. Gordon  cited  evidence  from 
a January  1973  survey  that only about  one in three  job seekers  rejected  job 
offers (Monthly Labor Review, August 1975) as evidence of the inaccuracy 
of search  models.  He objected  to Hall's  attempt  to explain  unemployment 
as voluntary  when  it often is involuntary.  Hall replied  that workers  ordi- 
narily  reject  job opportunities  simply  by not pursuing  them  to the point of 
an offer,  so the one-in-three  rejection  statistic  was not in conflict  with his 
model. 
George  Perry  and others  thought  Hall's  industrial  wage  dispersion  had 
little,  if anything,  to do with  the dispersion  ofjob opportunities  confronting 
any individual.  Saul  Hymans  doubted  that the mobility  of labor  was suffi- 
cient  to induce  workers  to hold out for a higher-paying  job, when  that  job 
was  likely  to be in a different  industry,  occupation,  or  region  of the  country. 
Hall  replied  that  he did  not expect  workers  to cross  occupational  lines,  but 
thought  industrial  and  regional  lines  surmountable.  Arthur  Okun  questioned 
the data used to analyze  wage  dispersion:  the manufacturing  data are not 
corrected  for overtime  and  shifts  among  industries  although  such  corrected 
data  are  available.  Still  worse,  the federal-government  data  include  military 
and civilian  workers.  Over  the period  of Hall's observations,  the propor- 
tions of each must vary  systematically  with military  buildups  and, hence, 
the unemployment  rate. 
Charles  Holt saw  the Hall  model  as deficient  in neglecting  adjustments  in 
the quality  of workers  hired.  Although  wages  may not fall, hiring  require- 
ments  may be raised  by firms  during  slack markets,  as Hall himself  had 
emphasized  in his earlier  work. Holt also argued  that the number  of job 
vacancies  would  be a factor  in a worker's  decision  to accept  or reject  a job. 
Franco Modigliani  had reservations  about Hall's method of approxi- 
mating  a cut in wages  in the MPS  model  by simulating  an expansion  of the 
nominal  money  supply.  He claimed  the response  would  be different,  par- 
ticularly  because  of the dynamics  in the wage and price sectors of the 
model. 
Schultze  offered  historical  evidence  that flexible  wages  in earlier  years 
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Fand  questioned  why  unemployment  persisted  so long in the 1930s  despite 
a 35  percent  cut in nominal  wages.  Martin  Feldstein  found  the  paper  useful 
in its analysis  of the behavior  of the competitive  part of the labor  market. 
He found Hall's work to be a valuable  complement  to other  theories  of 
wage  rigidity  in suggesting  a mechanism  for the spillover  of rigidity,  identi- 
fying  the sectors  in the economy  where  wages  are  most  rigid,  and  analyzing 
the  potential  for absorption  of persistent  unemployment  in the competitive 
sector. 
Several  other  participants  found  Hall  had  contributed  new  insights  to the 
difficult  question  of how unemployed  workers  respond  to conditions  in the 
labor  market.  But  they  felt  that  the paper  was  more  convincing  in identify- 
ing the inadequacies  of earlier  theories  of wage  rigidity  than  in supplying  a 
new explanation. 